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NOTES
GRoup PRACTIcE VERsus THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION
THE HIGH cost of medical care has long been a common ailment in the
American household.' To it may be attributed in large measure the inade-
quacy of the medical treatment now received by a sizeable proportion of the
population. 2 As one method of alleviating this condition, the Committee on
the Costs of Medical Care, with the experience of various private schemes
before it,3 recommended in 1932 "that medical service . . . should be fur-
nished largely by . . . groups of physicians . . ., organized, preferably
around a hospital; ' 4 and "that the costs of medical care be placed on a group
payment basis through the use of . . . insurance, . . . taxation, or . . .
both."5 This plan is founded on the principle that distribution of the price
of medical care over a wider base, coupled with a reduction of overhead by
group economies, will lower the cost per capita and perhaps insure more
regularized medical attention.( Under such a system, known to the medical
profession as group or contract practice, physicians enter into contracts at
stipulated rates with the non-profit association dispensing medical care.
Most of these plans for reducing the cost of medical care have been bit-
terly opposed by the present regime of the American Medical Association.1
1. See generally, FAmx, RoRau & RING, COSTS OF MEDICAL CAE (Publications of
Committee on Costs of Medical Care: No. 27, 1933).
2. Id. at 527.
3. Varied experiments along these lines have already been in existence for some time.
Employers have insured, voluntarily or by compulsion of law, against employee sidme-.
and injury. See MEDICAL CARE FOR THE AuFmic&N PEOPLE (Final Report of Committee
on Costs of Medical Care, 1932) 80-81. Employees have formed mutual benefit associa-
tions on their own initiative. See id. at 81; Irwin v. Lorio, 169 La. I00, 126 So. 669
(1930), cited infra note 24. Most significant, perhaps, have been the group practice
clinics under the joint sponsorship of professional and consumer groups 'which supply
medical services to groups of persons in exchange for fixed periodic payments. See MED-
ICAL CARE FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE (1932) 94-95; W urAzs, PrmcuAsn op MEDicAL
CARE THROUGH FixED PERIODIC PAYMENT (Publications of Nat. Bureau of Economic
Research, Inc., No. 20, 1932) ; FALx, Rorxu & RING, op. cit. supra note 1, 437-516.
Plans for non-profit hospital service financed by fixed periodic payments have recently
enjoyed a mushroom-like growth. "The forty approved plans, scattered through nineteen
States and the District of Columbia, have a combined membership of more than 1,600,000."
N. Y. Times, April 19, 1938, p. 44, col. 1; see id., April 14, 1938, p. 24, cols. 6-8; id.,
April 29, 1938, p. 23, col. 8.
4. MEDICAL C AR FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE (1932) 109.
5. Id. at 120.
6. It has been estimated that "a saving of over $78,000,000 might be effected through
a more efficient use of the existing personnel and institutional apparatus." See 83 Co.o.
REc., March 18, 1938, at 4939.
7. See notes 13 and 14, infra. Organized medicine deems contract practice "legiti-
mate and ethical . .. [when it is] the only way in which competent medical service can
be provided"; i.e., "when large numbers of workmen are employed remote from urban
centers;" where employers "are compelled by law to provide medical service for their
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That there may be valid objections to some forms of contract practice was
recognized by the medical care Committee itself.8 Contract practice may
offer an increased opportunity for the dispensing organizations to engage
in price competition9 with its attendant objectionable advertising.10 There
would also be a tendency to reduce the personal relationship between physi-
cian and patient, and to encroach upon cherished professional independence.11
But the ob'ections of organized medicine seem to stem largely from the fear
that continued growth of group practice will seriously impair the economic
position of the ordinary practitioner.
12
Skillful indeed has been the technique of organized medicine's attack. Under
cover of a barrage of propaganda within the ranks of the profession,"3 local
medical societies throughout the country have frequently expelled, suspended
or censured doctors who have engaged in any of the various forms of contract
practice deemed "unethical" by the majority.14 Typical of these tactics has
been the recent attack of the Medical Society of the District of Columbia upon
Group Health Association, Incorporated, an organization founded recently
to effectuate a plan for spreading and reducing the cost of medical care among
Government employees in Washington.15 Organized as a non-stock cor-
poration, the purpose of Group Health Association is
employees"; and where a small community can secure a competent physician by no other
means. Leland, Contract Practice (1932) 98 J. OF Am. MEDICAL Ass's, 808, 813.
C. III, Art. VI, § 2, Principles of Medical Ethics, Am. Medical Ass'n, condemns con-
tract practice when it results in "solicitation of patients, . . . underbidding to secure the
contract, . . . inadequate . . . compensation . . ., interference with reasonable com-
petition . [.. prevention of.] free choice of a physician .... conditions of employ-
ment [which] make it impossible to render adequate service to the patients, [and]
when the contract . . . is contrary to sound public policy." See EcoNoMIcs & E'rncs
OF MEDICINE (pamph., 1936) 45-4&
8. See MtDICAL CARE FOR THE AmEwncm PForz (1932) 82, 94-95.
9. Id. at 94; cf. Porter v. King County Medical Soc., 186 Wash. 410, 414, 58 P.
(2d) 367, 368-9 (1936).
10. See Leland, supra note 7, at 809-10.
11. See MEDICAL CAIE FOR THE AmEDucAx PzOPLE (1932) 82. That the above dis-
advantages may- be overstated, see id. at 95n.
12. See, e.g., the defense of organized medicine's conduct in Pratt v. British Medical
Ass'n [1919] 1 K. B. 244, 245, 272-3, cited infra, note 21.
13. The official organ of organized medicine is replete with this type of propaganda.
For a typical example, see Group Health Ass'n, Inc., (1937) 109 J. OF Am. MEDICAL
Ass'N, Oct. 2, 39B. See also 83 CONG. REc., March 28, 1938, at 5566. The council of the
N. Y. Medical Soc. has even gone so far as to propose a gag-law as an amendment to
the Society's by-laws, which would forbid the component county medical societies to
"initiate any policy, propose any legislation, or participate in any activities that are con:
trary to the policies of the State Society." See N. Y. Times, April 29, 1938, p. 23, col. 5.
14. Within the past eight years, local medical societies in Baton Rouge, Little Rock,
Milwaukee, Dallas, Washington, D. C., Philadelphia, Los Angeles, Seattle, Chicago,
et al., have taken this form of action. (Information through aid of Committee on Research
in Medical Economics). See Irwin v. Lorio, 169 La. 1090, 126 So. 669 (1930) ; Porter v.
King County Medical Soc., 186 Wash. 410, 58 P. (2d) 367 (1936).
15. For a summary of the plan of organization and operation of Group Health Ass'n,
see D. C. CHAP. OF NAT. LAWYERS GUILD (Committee on Gov't Service), RErORT ON
"to provide, without prefit to the corporation, for the service of physi-
cians and other medical attention . . .and hospital treatment . . . and
the construction and operation of a clinic anO . . .hospital . . .for the
members hereof and their dependents . . . [The membership] shall be
composed solely of civil employees of the executive branch of the United
States government service . . .-16
Following the technique of other local medical societies, the District ex-
pelled a young doctor for undertaking to sign a contract with Group Health
Association.1 7 His action, it was charged, violated the following pious by-law
of the Society:
"Section 1. 'It is unprofessional for a physician to dispose of his ser-
vices under conditions that make it impossible to render adequate service
to his patient or which interfere with reasonable competition among the
physicians of a community. To do this is detrimental to the public and to
the individual physician, and lowers the dignity of the profession.'
(Chap. III, Art. VI, Sec. 2, Principles of Medical Ethics, American Med-
ic- Association.) No member of the Society shall enter into a . . .con-
tract . .. of employment with any . . .association . . . the terms of
which .. . are in violation of the principles herein expressed. The cus-
tomary professional relationship of a physician to his patients, upon the
basis of individual fees for services rendered, shall not be regarded as a
contract within the meaning of this section."1 8
To estimate the effectiveness of expulsion as a method of deterring other
members of a medical society from engaging in group practice, it is necessary
to consider its effects upon the doctor actually expelled. This, in turn, involves
the difficult problem of weighing the degree of the society's control over local
hospitals against the doctor's economic independence of those hospitals. Thus,
expulsion may be of but slight consequence to doctors who are able to use
other hospitals, whether their own or the group's.1 0 But its effects may
GRoup HEALTH Ass'., Ixc. (mimeog., 1938) 1-8; 83 CONG. REc., March 17, 1933, at
4778-9. Its initial impetus came from a grant of $40,000 from the Home Owners Loan
Corp., the legality of which aroused a storm of controversy. RMon oN Group HM~n
Ass'N, Ixc. (1938) at 29. The Legislative Counsel of the U. S. Senate, although dis-
approving the grant, held it to be within the statutory authority of the HOLC. See
W rashington Post, Jan. 7, 1938, p. 1; p. 5, col. 2. The legality of Group Health Assn
itself has been attacked on the grounds, inter alia, that it has failed to comply with the
insurance laws of the Dist. of Columbia and that it is practising medicine in violation of
statute. See RPORT ON GROUP HEALTH Ass'x (1938) 17-28. A petition for a declaratory
judgment to determine its legality is now pending before the U. S. Dist. Court for the
Dist. of Columbia. See Group Health Ass'n v. Moor, In Equity, No. 66392.
16. Art. I, § 1, Certificate of Incorporation, Group Health Ass'n, Inc.
17. See 83 CoNG. R., March 22, 1938, at 5138. Another doctor felt compelled to
resign from Group Health Ass'n as a result of pressure applied by the Dist. Medical
Soc. See id.. March 28, 1938, at 5566.
I& C. IX, Art. III, § 1, By-laws of Medical Soc. of Dist. of Columbia.
19. Since the general public, naturally enough, approves attempts to reduce the cost
of medical care, expulsion hardly seems likely to result in serious injury to physicians'
reputations from this source.
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be little short of disastrous where, as in the District of Columbia, most or all
hospitals have a rule that patients may not be treated by physicians who arc
not members of the medical societies."
Regardless of the ultimate outcome of the various experiments to spread
and reduce the costs of medical care, the public obviously has a vital interest
in assuring a fair trial to organizations like Group Health Association. But
as long as medical societies can brandish the bludgeon of expulsion, free ex-
perimentation-long extolled, by the medical profession itself as the very
lifeblood of scientific progress--will be throttled. It is important to consider,
therefore, whether the expelled doctor can obtain redress in the courts against
either the medical society or the hospital.
In weighing his chances against the medical society, the doctor must first
decide whether he is interested primarily in money damages or in reinstate-
ment. Should he desire the former, he might argue, following the lead of an
English decision, 2 ' that expulsion from the society and consequent exclusion
from hospitals constitute an unlawful conspiracy and boycott." Although
the punitive effect of a series of successful verdicts might influence organized
medicine to alter its present policy, mere money damages probably would
not adequately compensate the individual doctor. Furthermore, proof of
malice, the basis of his cause of action, might be somewhat difficult.m
Should the doctor prefer the more complete remedy of reinstatement, be-
fore he can obtain relief from the courts he probably must first exhaust his
remedies within the society.24 In the case of a doctor expelled by the District
Society, this would involve-an appeal to the Judicial Council of the American
Medical Association; if the order of expulsion is given by a county med-
ical society, an intermediate appeal must first be taken to the state medical
20. See 83 CoNG. Rc., March 22, 1938, at 5136-38; id., March 28, 1938, at 5565-67.
This is commonly the situation elsewhere. See State ex reL Mayfield v. St. Louis Med-
ical Soc., 91 Mo. App. 76, 81, 84 (1901); Sisters of St. Francis v. Board of Review,
231 Ill. 317, 322, 323, 83 N. W. 272, 274 (1907) ; People ex tel. Replogle v. Julia F. Burn-
ham Hospital, 71 I1. App. 246, 247 (1897) ; Irwin v. Lorio, 169 La. 1090, 1095, 126 So.
669, 670 (1930); Weyrens v. Scotts Bluff County Medical Soc., 277 N. W, 378, 379
(Neb., 1938); Harris v. Thomas, 217 S. W. 1068, 1070 (Tex. Civ. App., 1920).
21. Pratt v. British Medical Ass'n [1919] 1 Y. B. 244 (by means of threats and
widely extended coercive action, members of the Ass'n pursued a system of professional
and social ostracism against the plaintiff doctors who had engaged in contract practice) ;
compare Thompson v. New South Wales Branch of British Medical Ass'n [1924] A. C.
764 (P. C.).
22. The doctor might also recover damages for libel and slander, as did the plaintiff
in Pratt v. British Medical Ass'n [1919] 1 K. B. 244.
23. Cf. Thompson v. New South Wales Branch of British Medical Ass'n [1924]
A. C. 764 (P. C.). That such proof is by no means impossible, see Pratt v. British Med-
ical Ass'n [1919] 1 K. B. 244, cited supra note 21. There, however, the action of the
defendant medical association may have been more drastic and extensive.
24. Irwin v. Lorio, 169 La. 1090, 126 So. 669 (1930) (expulsion of physician under
contract with Stanacola Employees' Medical & Hospital Ass'n) ; Weyrens v. Scotts Bluff
County Medical Soc., 277 N. W. 378 (Neb., 1938) (plaintiff expelled for violating reso-
lution of society in effect declaring it "unethical" for any member to care for relief
patients at greatly reduced rates) ; see Chafee, Internal Affatrs of Associations Not for
Profit (1930) 43 HAnv. L. Rzv. 993, 1019-20.
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society.25 Nevertheless, there is some authority to the effect that appeal may
be dispensed with where it would take too long,20 where there is obvious pre-
judgment of the case in the appellate tribunal, "-2 7 or, possibly, where the griev-
ance arises out of a provision contravening public policy32 However, the
likelihood of obtaining a similar decision is hardly certain enough to offset the
risk of the delay that would result from an unsuccessful attempt.
If the appellate bodies affirm the decision of the local medical society after
both notice and a fair trial in accordance with all the relevant by-laws,20 the
doctor may then seek reinstatement in the courts by bringing an action for
mandatory injunction or mandamus30 against the local medical society.3 ' At
the outset, he will have the burden of surmounting judicial reluctance to
interfere with the internal affairs of so-called non-profit associations.P Con-
25. See People ex reL. Wilson v. Medical Soc., 84 Hun 448, 450, 32 N. Y. Supp. 415,
416 (2d Dep't 1895).
If the doctor seeks money damages, there is some authority to the effect that he need not
exhaust his internal remedies. Thompson v. Grand Int. Bro. of Loc. Engineers, 41 Tex.
Civ. App. 176, 91 S.W. 834 (1905) (union); see Chafee, supra note 24, at 1020.
26. Fritz v. Knaub, 57 Misc. 405, 103 N. Y. Supp. 1003 (Sup. Ct. 1907) (union),
aff'd, 124 App. Div. 915, 108 N.Y. Supp. 1133 (3d Dep't 1903) ; Local Lodge No. 104 v.
Int. Bro. of Boiler Makers, 158 Wash. 480, 291 Pac. 328 (1930) ; see Stafford, Disputes
Within Trade Unions (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 1248, 1263; Chafee, jupra note 24, at 1019.
The by-laws of at least some state medical soaieties provide that expulsion or uspen-
sion from the local society does not take effect until the state society has passed upon the
appeal. See Irwin v. Lorio, 169 La. 1090, 1098; 126 So. 669, 671 (1930), cited supra note
24. Where such is the case, any delay pending appeal should not prove so harmful to the
expelled doctor's interests.
27. Edrington v. Hall, 168 Ga. 484, 148 S. E. 403 (1929) (union).
28. Cf. Cameron v. Int. Alliance of Theatrical State Employees, 118 N. J. Eq. 11,
176 AUt. 692 (1935) (dosed shop agreement held an unwarrantable restraint of trade),
(1935) 44 YA=.L. J. 1446.
29. Reid v. Medical Soc., 156 N. Y. Supp. 780 (Sup. Ct., 1915), afd, 177 App.
Div. 939, 163 N. Y. Supp. 1129 (3d Dep't, 1917); Stevens v. Emergency Hospital, 142
Md. 526, 121 Atl. 475 (1923); Brown v. Harris County Medical Soc., 194 S. V. 1179
(Tex. Civ. App., 1917); see Thompson v. New South Wales Branch of British Medical
Ass'n [1924] A. C. 764, 778 (P. C.).
The burden of proof is said to be on the medical society. Reid v. Medical Soc., supra.
30. Although generally mandamus may be employed only to enforce a public duty
[see CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) 89; Note (1910) 16 Ann. Cas. 1246], it has
occasionally been allowed against unincorporated associations. Otto v. Journeymen Tail-
ors' Union, 75 Cal. 308, 17 Pac. 217 (1888); Stahl v. Romanian Young Men's Ass'n, 77
N. J. L. 380. 71 Atl. 1114 (1909) ; In re Miller v. Builders' League, 29 App. Div. 630,
53 N. Y. Supp. 1016 (1st Dep't 1898). But "at all events, the judicial attitude toward an
expulsion does not appear to be affected by any difference between mandamus and injunc-
tion.'" See Chafee, supra note 24, at 1014.
Certiorari is no longer a proper remedy. Vatson v. Medical Soc., 38 N. J. L. 377
(1876) ; People ex rel. Wilson v. Medical Soc., 84 Hun 448, 32 N.Y. Supp. 415 (2d Dcp't
1895).
31. The state medical society is not a proper defendant in an action for reinstatement
of a member of a constituent county medical society. Reid v. Medical Soc., 156 N. Y.
Supp. 780, 791 (Sup. Ct., 1915), cited supra note 29.
32. See State ex rel. Mayfield v. St. Louis Medical Soc., 91 Mo. App. 76, 84 (1901);
Harris v. Thomas, 217 S. W. 1068, 1077 (Tex. Civ. App., 1920) ; Porter v. King County
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sequently, the court should be impressed initially with the inapplicability of
precedents involving other organizations, ranging all the way from social
clubs and secret societies to the Roman Catholic Church. Although unjusti-
fied expulsion from social clubs may involve considerable unpleasantness and
even injury to personality, seldom does it carry with it the severe economic
consequences attendant upon expulsion from medical societies which control
practice in hospitals. An expelled club member may seek solace in other social
activities; the expelled doctor risks his means of livelihood. 33 Further-
more, in the case of expulsion from a social club, justice to the individual
club member is the maximum extent of the public interest. But when the
dispute centers about this type of medical question, the state is vitally inter-
ested in safeguarding the fair trial of an experiment designed to lend the
assistance of private resources to the solution of a problem which clearly
involves the commonweal: national health. Equally inapplicable are the cases
involving the internal affairs of secret societies and the Roman Catholic
Church. Judicial non-interference with the former has justifiably been predi-
cated upon the difficulties of mastering the ritual of the organizations.3 4 And
experience has proved that the judicial needs of the Church may be adequate-
ly satisfied by the long-established system of canon law.35
On the other hand, expulsions from labor unions afford neater analogies.
The greater readiness of the courts to mix into internal union affairs may be
explained in part by the greater economic value of membership to the expelled
laborer.36 When a trade union has a partial or complete monopoly of em-
ployment in the community, the economic consequences of expulsion upon a
member are not unlike the effects of expulsion upon the physician. Hence
the doctor should experience little difficulty in demonstrating that the medical
society's action has injured that elusive sine qua non of equity jurisdiction-
a property right. 7
Without challenging the validity of the by-law itself, the doctor might con-
tend that he had not actually violated it; for example, that the contract of
the Washington physician with Group Health Association does not "inter-
fere with reasonable competition among physicians" of the District.38 Athwart
this proposition, however, is the doctrine that the constituted authorities with-
in the society have the final power of determining whether the by-law has
been violated, 9 provided their decision is made in good faith in accordance
Medical Ass'n, 186 Wash. 410, 418-19, 58 P. (2d) 367, 370; Stafford, supra note 26, at
1260.
33. Compare Harris v. Geier, 112 N. J. Eq. 99, 106, 164 Ati. 50, 53 (Ch., 1932)
(union).
34. See Chafee, supra note 24, at 1023.
35. Id. at 1025-26.
36. See Stafford, supra note 26, at 1262.
37. But see Weyrens v. Scotts Bluff County Medical Soc., 277 N. W. 378, 379 (Neb.
1938).
38. See c. IX, art. III, § 1, By-laws of Medical Soc. of Dist. of Columbia, quoted in
full supra page 1195.
39. Bryant v. Dist. of Columbia Dental Soiety, 26 App. D. C. 461 (1906); see
Chafee, supra note 24, at 1020 et seq.
1198 (Vol, 47
with the by-laws, after notice and fair hearing.0 Yet there is authority to the
effect that the reviewing court has power to determine whether there was any
evidence whatsoever to support the expulsion. 4'
Perhaps a more effective mode of proceeding would be to attack the valid-
ity of the by-law under which expulsion was ordered. Reinstatement of ex-
pelled trade unionists has often been bottomed upon the ground that the
by-law upon which expulsion was based was void because unreasonable or
contrary to public policy.42 Taking his cue from such cases, the expelled doc-
tor might contend that the by-law of the District Medical Society as here
applied is in restraint of trade and therefore contrary to public policy. Al-
though the suggestion that medicine is a "trade" may be tinged with irrever-
ence, its aptness can scarcely be doubted in view of the impact of modem
business upon the profession.43 Primarily, the doctor would urge that his
expulsion was part of a scheme by which the Society hoped to destroy Group
Health Association and thereby remove the threat which its continued exist-
ence constitutes to the schedule of fees charged by the regular practitioner
in the District. Although the Society has not directly attempted to regulate
the fees charged by its members, 44 it is seeking to preserve the price of med-
ical care, within broad limits at least, by combining the weapon of expulsion
with its virtual monopoly over the hospitals in the District. An informed
court might find such conduct to be in restraint of trade, and invalidate the
offending by-law.
Still another attack against the medical society, issuing from a different
source, would also seek support from the proposition that the by-law is con-
trary to public policy. Where a doctor has signed a contract with some organi-
zatibn like Group Health Association, but has later breached it as a result of
a medical society's threat of expulsion, the health organization might sue the
society for inducing the breach. Such an action was recently brought in the
state of Washington, but without success.45 There the court refused to con-
sider the reasonableness of the by-law, and consequently held that the society
40. See note 29, supra.
41. Reid Y. fedical Society, 156 N. Y. Supp. 780, 789 (Sup. Ct., 1915).
42. See Stafford, supra note 26, at 1267, and cases cited. American cases involving
medical societies in which this contention was successful are: State ex rd Waring v.
Georgia Medical Soc., 38 Ga. 608 (189) (doctor expelled for becoming surety on crim-
inal bonds of colored persons) ; People ex "I Gray v. Medical Soc., 24 Barb. 570 (N. Y.
Sup. Ct., 1857) (doctor expelled for disregarding tariff of fees established by society);
contra: VWeyrens v. Scotts Bluff County 3Medical Soc., 277 N. NV. 378 (Neb., 1938);
Ewald v. Medical Soc., 144 App. Div. 82, 128 N. Y. Supp. 886 (Ist Dep't 1911), ret'g, 70
Misc. 615, 130 N. Y. Supp. 1024 (1911) ; Porter v. King County Iedical Soc., 186 ,Vash.
410, 58 P. (2d) 367 (1936) ; cf. Fawcett v. Charles, 13 Vend. 473 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1835).
43. See Statement by Ifalton II. Hamilton. MEDICAL CARE FOR Ti AmxErmcA.i PEO-
PLE (1932) 189, 193-5.
44. See People ex reL Gray v. Medical Soc., 24 Barb. 570 (N. Y. Sup. Ct, 1857):
compare Rohlf v. Kasemeier, 14b Iowa 182, 118 N. NV. -76 (1903). The District Medical
Society has a free schedule but it is probably not generally familiar to, nor is it observed
by, many members of the Society.
45. Porter v. King County Medical Soc., 186 Wash. 410. 58 P. (2d) 367 (1936),
(1936) 36 CoL L. REv. 1371.
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had the right to employ the threat of expulsion to compel its members to
obey its by-laws. 46 But a court persuaded to take an opposite view as to the
reasonableness of the by-law might find it in restraint of trade, and thereby
remove the justification for the society's threat of expulsion.
If the expelled doctor has been excluded from a public hospital, he might
seek readmittance by mandamus or mandatory injunction 47 on the ground
that public hospitals cannot damn as "unethical" that which is not prohibited
by statute or public policy. 48 Although authority is sparse and conflicting,4
in at least one case a court reinstated a physician dismissed from the staff
of a hospital.5 0 There the doctor had engaged in fee-splitting which, though
contrary to the rules of the hospital, was not prohibited by the state statute
regulating professional ethics."' Distinguishing between public and private
hospitals, 52 the court held that however unethical the doctor's conduct might
have been, according to other standards, it violated neither the statutes nor
the public policy of the state and therefore could not lawfully be made
grounds for exclusion from public hospitals.53 Whether this decision would
be followed in the instant type of case is admittedly conjectural. At all events,
most of the authorities supporting a contrary position involved the exclusion
of osteopaths and homeopaths. 54 These expulsions are easily distinguishable
46. Ibid.
47. See note 30, supra; Anon., Comb. 41 (K. B., 1686) ("mandamus to restore a
surgeon to an hospital . . . denied; . . . not . . . a publiclr office"); State ex. rel
Wolff v. La Crosse Lutheran Hospital Ass'n, 181 Wis. 33, 193 N. W. 994 (1923) (man-
damus to compel reinstatement to hospital staff held improper remedy; specific perform-
ance suggested as proper).
The term public, as here used, is limited to hospitals operated by governmental units,
whether federal, state or local.
48. If practising in Montana, the doctor's case would gain support from a statute
[MoNT. REv. CODEs Amx. (Anderson & McFarland, 1935) § 11577] which prohibits
charitable, tax-exempt hospitals from discriminating "between the patients of any regu-
larly licensed physician by reason of the fact that said physician is not a member of the
medical staff of said hospital, or for any other reason, and such hospitals are hereby com-
pelled to admit and care for the patients of any regularly licensed physician . . . under
the same terms . . . as . .'. the patients of any other regularly licensed physician."
But this law is said to be unique. See LAPP & KErCHAM, HOSPITAL LAW (1926) at 398.
49. The cases are collected in Note (1929) 60 A. L. R. 656; see LAPP & KETCIAM,
HosPrrAL LAW (1926) § 361.
50. Henderson v. Knoxville, 157 Tenn. 477, 9 S. W. (2d) 697 (1928); see also
Stevens v. Emergency Hospital, 142 Md. 526, 121 Atd. 475 (1923).
51. Henderson v. Knoxville, 157 Tenn. 477, 9 S. W. (2d) 697 (1928).
52. Id. at 483, 9 S. MT. (2d) at 698. The court cited no authority supporting the rele-
vance under the facts involved in the case of its distinction between public and private
hospitals.
53. Ibid.
54. Hayman v. Galveston, 273 U. S. 414 (1927); Newton v. Board of County Com-
missioners, 86 Colo. 446. 282 Pac. 1068 (1929) ; Harris v. Thomas, 217 S. W. 1068 (Tex.
Civ. App., 1920); cf. Lambing v. Board of County Commissioners, 45 Idaho 468, 263 Pac.
992 (1928). For cases involving expulsion from medical societies for similar reasons, see
Barrows v. Massachusetts Medical Soc.. 12 Cush. 402 (Mass., 1853); Gregg v. Massa-
chusetts Medical Soc., IIl Mass. 185 (1872).
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in that the action was not conditioned by the socio-economic predilections
of the majority but was based, rather, upon a determination of professional
competence-concededly a matter in which the decision of physicians should
be final.
55
Uncertain and untried though many of these devices may be, they may at
least serve to arouse public opinion in favor of a fair trial of group practice.
Clearly, however, the ultimate fate of experiments designed to reduce the cost
of medical care will not be determined by the success or failure of some ex-
pelled doctors in securing from hesitant courts a few scattered reinstatement
decrees. In the last analysis, the solution lies not in the decrees of judges
but in overcoming the stubborn intolerance of organized medicine. The recent
revolt of a group of influential dissenters within the ranks of the American
Medical Association"6 indicates that perhaps the change may be accomplished
with a minimum of outside interference. Failing this, the most effective alter-
native is to press present plans for a Congressional investigation of organized
medicine.57
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE PROHIBITING SALES AT LESS THAN COST*
ATTEr~rs to secure some type of legislative control over predatory price
cutting stem, in part, from the Supreme Court decision of 19111 voiding
resale price provisions contained in the contract between manufacturer and
distributor. Recent efforts have culminated in a series of statutes whose
potential effectiveness, in sharp contrast to the impotence of those preceding,2
55. If the doctor is on the regular staff of the hospital, whether public or private,
prior to exclusion for any cause, he is probably entitled to notice and a fair hearing in
accordance with the by-laws. Stevens v. Emergency Hospital, 142 Md. 526, 121 Ad. 475
(1923); contra: Van Campen v. Olean General Hospital, 210 App. Div. 204, 203, 205
N. Y. Supp. 554, 557 (4th Dep't 1924), aff'd, 239 N. Y. 615, 147 N. E. 219 (1925) (no
right to hearing in absence of by-law imposing such a requirement).
56. See N. Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1937, p. 1, col. 5; id., April 7, 1938, p. 1, col. 7; p. 24,
cols. 2-3.57. A resolution authorizing an investigation of organized medicine is now pending
in the House of Representatives. See H. R. Res. No. 452, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938).
*Balzer v. Caler, 74 P. (2d) 839 (Cal. App. 1937).
1. Dr. Iiles Medical Co. v. John D. Park and Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373 (1911).
2. The federal legislation is of course limited to articles in interstate commerce.
The Clayton Act was aimed directly at price discriination. 38 STAT. 730 (1914),
15 U. S. C. § 13 (1934) ; cf. The Robinson-Patman Amendment, 49 STr. 1526 (1936),
15 U. S. C. § 13 (Supp. 1937). The Federal Trade Commission was given power to
prevent "unfair methods of competition." 38 STAT. 717 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 45 (1934).
But the term has been held not to inhibit price cutting unless accompanied by malicious
purpose or acts otherwise unlawful Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Federal Trade Comm.
258 Fed. 307 (C. CA. 7th, 1919) ; Ward Baking Co. v. Federal Trade Comm. 264 Fed.
330 (C. C. A. 2d, 1920). Action by The Commission with respect to price cutting has
been negligible. See NAT. IND. CONF. BOARD, PUDLIC REGULATION OF CUPnTzva
PRAcTiCEs (1929) 60. Bills to legalize resale price maintenance have been before
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reflects a widespread and genuine desire to eliminate unfair methods of com-
petition from the price scarred field of business.3 Aimed primarily at cut
price retailing and the ruinous use of loss leaders, and bottomed upon a pro-
vision legalizing resale price maintenance, these newer statutes 4 seek their
effectiveness in a single provision penalizing all who sell in disregard of the
manufacturer's contract, even though not parties to it.r In 1937, thirteen
states,6 encouraged by strong if somewhat guarded approval from the Su-
preme Court,' proceeded to implement the weapon in an endeavor to give
Congress in each session since 1914; none has been passed. See SELIGMAN AND LovE,
PRICE CUTTING AND PRICE MAINTENANCE (1932) 479-484.
Similarly, state legislation against price discrimination has been plentiful. See Cham-
berlain, Legislative Prohibitions of Unfair Practices (1924) 10 A. B. A. J. 44, But
attempts to encourage resale price maintenance have until recently been limited to amend-
ments to state anti-trust acts providing that no agreement is to be deemed unlawful the
object of which is to market at a reasonable profit those products which could not
otherwise be so marketed. E.g., CAL. GEN. LAws (Deering, 1931) Act 8702, § 1. The
vagueness of this provision gave no assurance to the manufacturer of the legality of his
contemplated action. Scattered statutes of somewhat later origin unconditionally sanc-
tioned vertical resale price maintenance agreements, but proved ineffectual since they
bound only parties to the'contract. See note 5, infra.
3. The most active sponsors of the legislation have been well organized retail
organizations, especially in the drug trade. Extensive price cutting on the part of inde-
pendents with low overhead costs and a rapid rate of turnover has to some degree
swung chain store sentiment in favor of regulation. Reaction of manufacturers and
wholesalers coincides with that of the retail organizations, though somewhat less em-
phatic. Consumer opinion is difficult to ascertain. Price surveys made in California
since the passage of the Fair Trade Act tend to show, however, that the elimination of
deep price cuts in a few articles, prevalent under the unrestrained use of loss leaders,
has resulted in a slight general reduction of prices due to more shallow cuts among a
greater variety of articles. See generally, Grether, Experience in California with Fair
Trade Legislation Restricting Price Cutting (1936) 24 CALn. L. Ray. 640; Grether,
Solidarity in the Distributive Trades in Relation to the Control of Price Competition
(1937) 4 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 375; ZORN AND FEWMAN, BUSInEsS UNDER Tn NEW
PRICE LAws (1937) 21.
4. Such statutes are now in operation in 43 states. See ZoiRN AND FELDMAN, op.
cit. supra note 3, at 297.
5. This provision put teeth into resale price maintenance statutes. Previous legis-
lation bound only parties to the manufacturer's contract and was unavailing against dis-
tributors and retailers acquiring their goods from other sources. See ZoRN AND FEDMAN,
op. cit. supra note 3, at 289.
6. Ariz., Ark., Colo., Ky., Md., Minn., Mont., Neb., Ore., Pa., S. C (1932), Tenn.,
Utah., Wyo. See 1 PRENTICE HALL, FED. TRADE AND INDUSTRY SERvIcE (2d ed. 1937)
95,001 et seq.
7. Old Dearborn Co. v. Seagram Corp., 299 U. S. 183 (1936); The Pep Boys v.
Pyroil Sales Co., 299 U. S. 198 (1936). In these cases the Fair Trade Acts of Illinois
and California were upheld. Cf. Calvert Distillers' Corp. v. Nussbaum Liquor Store,
2 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 320 (Sup. Ct. 1938). The Supreme Court decisions are limited in
effect to trademarked goods and the property interest therein. See, generally, Comment
(1937) 23 VA. L. REV. 914; Note (1937) 50 HARv. L. Ray. 667.
it wider reach and sharper thrust.8 The newest legislation is modelled after
a California law which specifically prohibits sales below cost "for the purpose
of injuring competitors and destroying competition," defines cost as "invoice
or replacement cost . . . whichever is lower . . . plus the cost of doing
business," and lists the items to be included in the latter.0 No limitation
is set as to the type of business affected by the statute, but, among other
exceptions, it is provided that the law shall not apply to selling "in an
endeavor made in good faith to meet the legal prices of a competitor."'10
The constitutionality of these provisions vas recently passed upon in
California. In a private suit to enjoin acts in violation of the statute, the
defendant retail grocer was found to have sold four well-kmown articles
at less than invoice or replacement cost, but with no purpose of injuring
competitors or destroying competition, .and solely in order to meet the
reduced prices of competitors and to advertise his business. The appellate
court did not disturb these findings, and affirmed the denial of the injunc-
tion. But, unwilling to rest its decision upon the facts as found, it proceeded
with appropriate reluctance to consider the unconstitutionality of the statute.
Under penetrative scrutiny it was found to violate provisions of State and
Federal Constitution alike.1 '
The grounds of the decision are three-fold. It is asserted initially that
the statute fails to conform to Article 1, Section 1 of the State Constitution
which provides that all laws of a general nature shall have an uniform opera-
tion. The violation is said to consist in the fact that large chain and depart-
& The Fair Trade Acts apply only to branded articles and involve vertical price
fixing alone. They are enforceable only by the owners of the brand. Schenley Products
Co. v. Franklin Stores Co., 122 N. J. Eq. 69, 192 At. 375 (Ch. 1937). They are de-
pendent for their effectiveness upon the initiative of manufacturers and distributors at
the apex of the distributive pyramid. In certain trades this initiative is not forthcoming.
See ZORN AND FELDSAN, Op. cit. supra note 3, at 317; McAllister, Price Control by Law
in the United Stlates, (1937) 4 LAw & Commp. PnoB. 273, 293. For an example of the
hostility with which the New York statute has been met by courts and particular indus-
tries, see Kline v. Davega-City Radio Corp., N. Y. L J., April 19, 1938, p. 1891, col 3.
9. CAi. GEN. LAWs (Deering, Supp. 1935) Act 8781, §§ 3-6. "The 'cost of doing
business' . . . must include without limitation the following items of expense: labor
(including salaries of executives and officers), rent, interest on borrowed capital, depre-
ciation, selling cost, maintenance of equipment, delivery costs, credit losses, all types
of licenses, taxes, insurance and advertising." § 3, par. 3.
10. Enforcement of the act is governed by §§ 10, 11 and 8. Section 10 allows a
suit by any person, firm, private corporation or municipal corporation or other public
corporation or trade association to maintain an action to enjoin a continuance of any act
or acts in violation of the statute, without alleging or proving actual damages. If actual
damages are sustained recovery may be had therefor as well as injunctive relief. Section
11 makes a violation of the act a misdemeanor punishable by a fine not to exceed $1000,
or imprisonment not exceeding 6 months, or both. Section 8 provides that upon the
third violation of the Act by any corporation the Attorney General must institute suit
for forfeiture of the corporation's charter rights and to permanently enjoin it from
transacting business in the state.
11. Balzer v. Caler, 74 P. (2d) 839 (Cal. App. 1937). A lower court had upheld
the statute. People v. Kahn, 19 Cal. App. (2d) 758, 60 P. (2d) 596 (1936).
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ment stores whose wholesale cost is lower and whose facilities for allocation
are greater may sell their goods at a lower price than that permitted the
smaller merchant, without infringing the statutory prohibition. This, in turn,
is claimed not only to constitute unlawful discrimination but to defeat the
very purpose for which the statute was created.12 The premises are not
entirely correct 8 and the conclusion is tinged with absurdity. Uniformity
of operation does not necessitate identity of result.14 If there is any "dis-
crimination" in the instant case it is due to the very fact that the law is
uniform in operation and does not classify. It is true that by defining the
permissible price to be charged as cost the statute may enable one group
to sell for less than another. The poison, if such it be, contains its own
antidote by exempting from operation of the statute any endeavor made in
good faith to meet the legal prices of competitors.15
The second attack launched against the act found it void for uncertainty
in its definition of cost. Undoubtedly statutes which embody criminal sanc-
tions are peculiarly susceptible to such accusations and are frequently in-
validated upon that ground alone by the highest courts.10 Upon such occa-
sions the standard of conduct has almost invariably been phrased in words
such as "undue"' 7 or "unreasonable," 18 terms whose subjective basis permits
definition only by circularity and synonym. The term "cost" is not subject
to the same type of imprecision since the variation in its meaning is articu-
lated in reasonably objective systems of cost accounting.19 The uncertainty
which does exist arises from the difficulty of ascertaining the facts necessary
to conform to the prescribed standard. Such considerations, however, are
apposite to the questiof of the statute's reasonableness rather than to the
question of the statute's certainty.
20
The final and most authoritative ground for the holding lies in the fact
that the statute involves regulation by price fixing of businesses unaffected
with a public interest.2 ' Dialectically it is possible to tight rope over this
" 12. "Th legislature declares that the purpose of this act is to safeguard the public
against the erection or perpetuation of monopolies and to foster and encourage compe-
tition by prohibiting unfair and discriminatory practices . . . " UNFAm Co,'r.'rrnoN
AcT, CAT. GEN. LAws (Deeiing, Supp. 1935) Act 8781, § 13.
13. See ZORN AND FE ,MAN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 21.
14. State v. Darling, 216 Iowa 553, 246 N. W. 390 (1933); Bowers v. Glos, 346
Ill. 623, 179 N.E. 80 (1931).
15. Section 6(d). See note 9, supra.
16. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385 (1926); United States
v. Shreveport Grain Elevator Co., 46 F. (2d) 354 (W. D. La. 1930). But cf. Nash
v. United States, 229 U. S. 373 (1913) ; Coplin v. United States, 88 F. (2d) 652 (C. C. A.
9th, 1937).
17. Tozer v. United States, 52 Fed. 917 (E. D. Miss. 1892).
18. United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81 (1921).
19. See People v. Kahn, 19 Cal. App. (2d) 758, 765, 60 P. (2d) 596, 599 (1936).
Compare the problems of valuation in public utility regulation. BONBRIGHT, THE VALUA-
TIo oF PROPm T (1937).
20. Cf. Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373 (1913).
21. Cf. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 267 U. S. 552 (1925),
(1923) 33 YALE L. J. 196; Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418 (1927), (1927)
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traditional inferno since the individual's cost, and hence his price, can be
varied at will.2 Pragmatically, -however, the right of an owner to fix his
price is seriously limited. Prior to the decision in Nebba v. Now York"
the result reached in the principal case would have been the only probable
one; no extension, however liberal, of the doctrine of affectation with a
public interest, could have upheld a statute which has universal application
to all business. Insofar as the Nebbia case involved a particular business in
drastic need of regulation it is not helpful as a direct precedent. Insofar as
it performed a delicate surgical excision of the growth of Lord Hale's phrase
from the tissue of regulation it may be taken to have in part alleviated the
pressure exercised upon the Court's mind by that phrase, and with it the
attendant complex against price fixing.24 If the case be interpreted as setting
up as criteria merely the necessity for, and the reasonableness of the regu-
lation, the statute herein might conceivably be upheld.
Of the existence of the need there can be little doubt. The courts have
by now been persuaded of the destructiveness of price cutting tactics," and
the ineffectiveness of even the most rigid resale price maintenance statutes
to cope t~herewith is apparent. 20 The reasonableness of the legislation raises
somewhat more controversial questions. Even assuming a uniform and
ascertainable standard, the facts necessary for an accurate calculation of
cost are probably not available to the merchant during the course of any
current year.2 If available, the time and diligence required for an adequite
application thereof might well be considered a prohibitive strain upon the
small merchant's capacity. In addition to these difficulties, the proviso which
theoretically enables a man to meet the prices of competitors by placing the
floor under prices at the level of the lowest cost producer or distributor
imposes upon the seller the almost insuperable burden of determining whether
his competitors' prices are legal; in the event that they are not it offers him
the dubious and expensive remedy of litigation. Undoubtedly this suggests
36 YALE L. J. 985; Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350 (1928), (1928) 38 YAmn I. J. 225;
Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U. S. 235 (1929), (1929) 38 YA=X L J. 674; New
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262 (1932).
22. It is possible to argue that no price fixing is involved, since the legislature merely
places a level under prices below which the producer or distributor may not sell; and
that therefore, in all other respects, price may be the product of untramelled discretion.
Since, however, under strenuous competitive conditions an upper level is naturally
delimited close to cost, such discretion is narrowly confined.
23. 291 U. S. 502 (1934).
24: See Hamilton, Affectation ttith a Public Interest (1930) 39 YAru L. J. 1039.
25. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 (1934); Hegeman Farms Corp. v. Baldvin,
293 U. S. 163 (1934); Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew, 300 U. S. 603 (1937).
26. See note 8, supra.
27. For example, the estimated rate of turnover for the year is a factr which
enters into the determination of the price to be charged. Overestimation of the rate
may, at the close of any accounting period, reveal that the prices charged have been
insufficient to meet the costs. See Canning, Cost Accounting, 4 E?cycxrmrA op SoCIAI
SCIENCES (1930) 478; CHURCH, MANUFACrUING CosTs AND Accouirs (Zd ed. 1929);
CLARK, STUDIES IN THE EcoNOmiEs OF OVERHEAD COSTS (1923).
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a sound criticism of the act from a practical viewpoint.2 8 On the legal level
much of its force is absorbed by the insulating provision which requires
that, in addition to sales below cost, wrongful intent must be found, before
a violation of the statute may be said to have taken place. 20 Unfortunately
a literal interpretation of this provision may destroy as well as save, for
unless price cutting tactics and the use of the loss leader are held to raise
at least a presumption of wrongful intent, there will merely be another gelding
in the legislative stable.30 Viewed in this light the intent requirement would
seem of little aid to the practical difficulties confronting the merchant. The
fact remains, however, that hypothetical hardship does not seem appropri-
ate matter for judicial consideration where the case itself does not present
the issue. When and if the issue is squarely presented against its proper
factual background, with appropriate evidentiary material, it may well be
that these apprehensions will vanish-a theory fortified by the probability
that action will be taken under the act, as in the principal case, only in the
event of sales below invoice or replacement cost, items which are readily
ascertainable by all.
For the support of the act as a necessary and reasonable regulation, prec-
edent is wholly lacking. The cases involving resale price maintenance are
not significant save in creating a favorable atmosphere, since they involve
private price fixing and are justified only as a protection of the property
right in a branded article.3 ' Many of the N.R.A. codes contained provisions
forbidding sales below cost,3 2 and a few lower federal courts approved them,"3
but these decisions are thrown into obscurity by the Schechter case. 4 De-
cisions subsequent to the-Nebbia case have involved only the regulation of
specific industries, and have somewhat limited the broad principles evolved
in the-case by requiring a strong showing of the need for such regulation
and by emphasizing its emergency characteristic.,* The application of these
later restrictions will not necessarily find the instant statute incompatible
28. The difficulties may not be so great for the retailer, since his activities are far
less complex. Nothing in the Unfair Competition Acts, however, excludes manufacturers
or wholesalers from the operation of these provisions. See note 9, supra.
29. Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U. S. 497 (1925); see American Tel.
& Tel. Co. v. United States, 299 U. S. 232, 245 (1936).
30. Unless the presumption is held to exist, the statute is merely a codification of
the law prior to the legislative enactment. Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 119 N. W.
946 (1909) ; Boggs v. Duncan Schell Furniture Co., 163 Iowa 106, 143 N. W. 482 (1913) ;
cf. Remington-Rand, Inc. v. Master Craft Corp., 67 F. (2d) 218 (C. C. A. 6th, 1933).
From the paucity of cases deciding in favor of the complainant, the burden of proving
malicious purpose or intent may be inferred to be crushing.
31. See cases cited note 7, supra.
32. E.g., Code of Fair Competition For Retail Drug Trade, Art. 7, § 6. See MAYERS,
A HANDBOOK OF N. R. A. (2d ed. 1934).
33. United States v. Canfield Lumber Co., 7 F. Supp. 694 (D. Neb. 1934), dismissed
76 F. (2d) 1003 (1934); United States v. Spotless Dollar Cleaners, Inc., 6 F. Supp.'
725 (S. D. N. Y. 1934) ; see Comment (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 90, 96.
34. United States v. Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U. S. 495 (1935).
35. Bordens Farm Products Co. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U. S. 233 (1936); Mayflower
Farms v. Ten Eyck, 297 U. S. 266 (1936).
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with constitutional requirements. That business as an entirety requires regu-
lation in some of its aspects would not seem a wholly preposterous conclusion
for the court to reach; that permanent legislation of this type can be sustained
in view of the emphasis placed on the feature of emergency in prior cases
is somewhat more dubious. It would seem, however, that the character of
the situation rather than its abruptness should determine judicial action,
since the factual situation giving rise to an "emergency" is not limited in
duration by dictionary definition." Whatever the eventual decision may be,
a clarification of the doctrine laid down in Nebbia v. New Yorh may be ex-
pected when and if the present statute or one of its prototypes is brought
before the Supreme Court. In the event that such statute be found uncon-
stitutional solely because of the unreasonableness of the cost provisions,
rectification of the flaw seems simple. The statute would lose little in force
or effectiveness and yet the burden imposed by it would be considerably
lightened if the prohibition were restricted to sales below invoice or replace-
ment cost, with or without a flat mark-up provision3 7
MARTIN ERDUANN Ilt
THE BROKERAGE PROVISION OF THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT *
PRIOR TO 1936 the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company maintained cen-
tral buying offices in charge of agents, who exacted a brokerage fee from
sellers equivalent to the amount such sellers would have paid a selling broker.
The practice, prevalent among many large buying organizations, was the chief
cause for the insertion in the Robinson-Patman "Anti-Price Discrimination"
Act' of Section 2(c), which forbids the pa)ment of brokerage, or an allow-
36. See Note (1937) 47 YALE L J. 124.
37. Such a provision is contained in the Tennessee Unfair Sales Act. TEm N. Coos
ANN. (Williams, Supp. 1937) §§ 6770.7-6770.13. The Act, comparable in essential
features to the California Unfair Competition Act, was recently held constitutional in
a decision which is unsatisfactory in its failure to consider many of the problems involved.
Rust v. Griggs, 113 S. NV. (2d) 733 (Tenn. 1938). The provision as to cost was, however,
specifically upheld. It is worthy of note that the mark-up provided for is to be less
than the minimum cost of distribution by the most efficient retailer, which mark-up in
the absence of proof to the contrary is to be six percent This was held not to be open
to the charge of discrimination since it was but a rule of evidence legitimately enacted
by the legislature.
tSecond Year Class, Yale Law School.
* In the Matter of the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company, F. T. C. Docket
No. 3031, January 25, 1938.
1. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U. S. C. § 13 (Supp. 1937). See generally, TinE RODIN-
SON-PATU.A, AcT (Washington Post, 1936); THORP AND GEORGE. CuEcir LisT or Pos-
SIBLE EFFECTS OF THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT (Dun and Bradstreet, 1936); Pusce
DISCRIMINATION AND PRICE CuTrrING, 4 LAW AND CoDNrnP. PRon. 271; Fly, The Sugar
Institute and the Anti-Trust Laws: 2 (1936) 46 YAIE L. J. 228; Phillips, The Robinsor.-
Patinan Anti-Price Discrimination Law and the Chain Store (1936) 15 HArry. Bus. Rim.
62; Learned and Isaacs, The Robinson-Patman Law: Some Assumptions and Expeta-
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ance in lieu thereof, by the seller to the buyer or his agent except for services
rendered in connection with the sale.2 After the effective date of the Act the
Company instructed its agents to accept no more brokerage as such, but to
purchase on a net basis reflecting a reduction equal to the brokerage. None-
theless the Company was haled before the Federal Trade Commission and
ordered to cease and desist from accepting allowances representing broker-
age in whole or in part.8
As originally drafted in the Patman bill the brokerage provision did not
contain the exception for services rendered. 4 The evil to be remedied was the
levying of brokerage as a subterfuge to obtain price concessions.5 The excep-
tion was put in by the House Judiciary Committee6 after testimony that the
utnqualified prohibition might be unconstitutional7 and considerable objection
that there were cases in which the buyer should obtain a reduction because he
made no use of the seller's selling facilities." But in spite of the exception
the section was loosely reported to both the Senate and the House as per-
mitting payment by buyer or seller to his own broker, but prohibiting payment
by either to the other's agent." Thus the meaning and scope of the exception
were left uncertain. "For services rendered" might mean nothing insofar as
the buyer was concerned; it might mean that any incidental "service" by the
buyer or his agent to the seller was sufficient justification for the allowance
of brokerage; or it might mean something between the two that would har-
tions (1937) id. at 137; Robertson, The Robinson-Palman, Act, 14 Fon'ruN 96 (Nov.
1936); Comment (1936) 46 YAx. L. J. 447; Legis. (1936) 5D HAnv. L. REy. 106; Legis.
(1936) 36 Co. L. REV. 1285; ZoRN AND FELDmAN, BusINEss UNDER T E Naw PscE
LAws (Prentice-Hall, 1937).. For a recital of the practices leading to the passage of the
Act, see F. T. C., FxNAL R.PORT ON THE CHAIN-SToRE INVESTIGATION, SEN. Doc. No. 4,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
2. "That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of
such commerce, to pay or grant, or to receive or accept, anything of value as a commis-
sion, brokerage, or other compensation, or any allowance or discount in lieu thereof, ex-
cept for services rendered in connection with the sale or purchase of goods, wares, or
merchandise, either to the other party to such transaction or to an agent, representative,
or other intermediary therein where such intermediary is acting in fact for or in behalf,
or is subject to the direct or indirect control, of any party to such transaction other than
the person by whom such compensation is so granted or paid." 49 SrTA. 1527 (1936),
15 U. S. C. § 13(c) (Supp. 1937).
3. In the Matter of the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company, F. T. C. Docket
No. 3031, January 25, 1938. A petition to review and set aside the order of the Commls-
sion has been filed by the company with the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit. 5 U. S. L. Wmx 926 (April 5, 1938).
4. H. R. 8442, § 2(b), 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 1935.
5. See F. T. C., op. cit. supra note 1, at 25, 49, 62; Hearings of Committee on the
Judiciary on H. R. 8442, H. R. 4995, and H. R. 5o62, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 10-19,
1935) 16, 59, 62,76, 194, 217, 258; 80 CONG. Rae. 3116, 6281-2 (1936).
6. H. R. 8442, § 2(b), 74th Cong., 2d Sess., 1936; H. R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1936).
7. Hearings, supra note 5, at 81, 87, 242.
8. Hearings, spra note 5, at 148 et seq., 177.
9. H. R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 14; H. R. Rep. No. 2951, 74th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 7.
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monize the brokerage provision with the apparent philosophy of the Robinson-
Patman Act as a whole.
As was to be expected, the Company in its defense sought the broad inter-
pretation. The idea that the Company by going to the seller directly was ren-
dering to the seller the same service as an independent broker met the answer
that if a buyer reaches out to the seller there is no brokerage service at all
and therefore no need to pay brokerage to anyone. But the Company claimed
that it could accept reductions in price representing positive services rendered
by it through its agents to the sellers, emphasizing that its agents advised
sellers how to improve, pack and ship their goods, and were instrumental in
aiding sellers to dispose of surplus stocks which threatened to unstabilize
markets. If this contention were to prevail, it is clear that the exception would
nullify the section, for such services are nearly always present, and the excep-
tion was obviously not intended to create a condition upon which the broker-
age could be allowed as before. Accordingly, the Federal Trade Commission
found that these services were rendered solely in the buyer's interest and that
for the seller to reward the buyer for serving himself resulted in an unfair
rebate. But the Commission went further and reached the apparently far-
fetched interpretation of Congressional intent that the "for services rendered"
exception was meant only to permit payment to an independent broker.'0
The phrase was thus robbed of all significance for the buyer. The rationale
used had been employed to explain the section since the early discussions in
Congressn-the agent of either buyer or seller is a fiduciary incapable of ren-
dering services to the opposite party without breach of trust. The fiduciary
notion seems a misconception of the law of agency, for with the knowledge
of both parties the agent may legitimately accept compensation from each
2
And the issue here does not concern the agent or his compensation, but the
fact that the buyer receives the brokerage. But the conception of the agent's
function inherent in the rationale and adopted in the instant case is consistent
with a fair construction of the facts--whatever services the agent rendered
to the seller were really being performed for the buyer's benefit.
The Commission interpreted the exception in the same way in proceedings
involving the Biddle Purchasing Company and its clients.p The Biddle Com-
pany was a purchasing agency running a market information service for
wholesale buyers. It also filled buyers' orders, taking a brokerage fee from
the seller which it credited to the buyer's account and which in few cases
exceeded the buyer's debt to Biddle. Although the sellers testified that selling
through the Biddle Company was cheaper than through an agent, and that
many of them could not otherwise stay in business, the Commission ruled no
10. The interpretation urged by the Commission, that the exception removes a doubt
as to whether an independent broker could be paid at all because he is somewhat controlled
by each party to the sale, seems based upon an impossible interpretation of the rection
without the exception.
11. 80 CONG. REc. 3114 (1936); SEN. Doc. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936)
7; H. R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 15.
12. Bell v. McConnell, 37 Ohio St. 396 (1881); 1 MEcnmu, Amrucy (2d ed. 1914)
§ 178.
13. In the Matter of Biddle Purchasing Company, et a!., F. T. C. Docket No. 3032,
July 17, 1937, (1937) 6 GEo. VAsH. L REv. 203.
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services were rendered to the sellers by the buyers through the Biddle Com-
pany. But though it ordered the buyers to cease and desist from accepting
brokerage, the Biddle Company was ordered only not to accept brokerage
which it intended to pay or credit to buyers. The artificiality of the notion that
a broker must be either the buyer's agent or the seller's is here apparent,
14
for to become the seller's agent the Biddle Company need only retain the
brokerage charged to the seller, and donate its services to those buyers using
its purchasing facilities in proportion to their purchases. But so long as the
buyer receives the benefit of brokerage paid by the seller, there remains at
least a conceptual argument that the seller is not paying for brokerage services
rendered but is giving a rebate.
The Commission thus seems to have adopted the position that in no case
can a buyer make use of the "for services rendered" exception. The major
fault of this extreme interpretation is that it fails to recognize the distinction
between the problem of whether the buyer can be paid a brokerage fee, meas-
ured as an actual brokerage service rendered by him to the seller, and the
problem of whether he. should be allowed a reduction for a saving in selling
cost to the seller, measured by actual saving to the seller because of the buyer's
non-use of the seller's selling facilities. For illustration, it may be assumed
that one seller with his own sales force sells a commodity for $1.00, comput-
ing his selling cost at 10 cents, and that a second seller with no selling organi-
zation sells the same commodity for $1.00, paying 10 cents to a broker. A
buyer dealing directly with the first and receiving a reduction of 10 cents as
a brokerage, would be receiving a dummy brokerage since he would not. be
acting as a broker but as a buyer and because, due to the fixed cost of the
selling organization, the seller does not save 10 cents on that sale but some-
thing less. But if the buyer received from the first seller not the 10 cents but
the amount saved the seller, or if he received 10 cents from the second seller,
he would not be taking a "brokerage" but a discount reflecting the lower cost
to the seller.15 The former example is properly condemned as an unfair
method of competition. Granted without regard to the saving to the seller, it
amounts to a rebate effected by the buyer's power, and results in discrimina-
tion. But prohibition of the latter example seems contrary to the tenor of
the rest of the Act.
Section 2(a) of the Act, which prohibits price discriminations, specifically
permits differentials which make only due allowance for differences in the
cost of sale or delivery resulting from the differing methods in which com-
modities are sold.16 In one of its defenses the Company claimed that the sell-
er's reductions in prices to it could be justified on the same theory. But the
Commission held that while Section 2(a) deals with discrimination only,
Section 2(c), which refers to brokerage, strikes at both discrimination and
an unfair method of competition; and that Section 2(c) is by statutory con-
14. For the confusion that results from an attempt to determine for whom services
were rendered, compare Trunz Pork Stores v. Wallace, 70 F. (2d) 688 (C. C. A. 2d,
194) with Wilmington Provision Co. v. Wallace, 72 F. (2d) 989 (C. C. A. 3d, 1934).
15. See statement by Teegarden, author of the Patman bill, Hearings, supra note 5,
at 34.
16. 49 STAT. 1526 (1935), 15 U. S. C. § 13(a) (Supp. 1937).
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struction separate and distinct, unmodified by Section 2(a). As reported
from the Senate Committee, the cost proviso of Section 2(a) had the counter
exception inserted that brokerage costs were not excepted by the saving
clause.17 Senator Logan declared that the counter exception xas put in to har-
monize the cost proviso portion of Section 2(a) with the brokerage section,
which at that time did not contain the "for services rendered" exemption.18
He further stated that the counter exception should be removed because
legitimate brokerage should be allowed insofar as it represented a saving in
selling cost to the seller.19 When the bill was passed, the brokerage section
included the "for services rendered" exemption and the cost proviso did not
except brokerage. The insertion of the one and the deletion of the other
seem to show- an intent that any actual saving to the seller effected by the
buyer being his own broker could be properly reflected in the price, whether
or not Section 2(c) is shown to be independent of Section 2(a) and hence
unmodified by the cost proviso. Either the phrase "except for services
rendered" was intended to incorporate the principle of the cost proviso; or
Section 2(c) was intended to deal solely with dummy brokerage, and it was
expected that a reduction in price representing a saving in selling costs to
the seller would not fall under Section 2(c) but under Section 2(a).' °
But although the doctrine of the statute thus construed is comparatively
clear, its application to particular facts would cause difficulty. It was doubtless
largely for that reason that the Commission chose its interpretation, in order
to avoid possibility of vitiating loopholes.21 Whether the buyer effects a sav-
ing in cost to the seller by buying direct will depend upon whether the price
from which the supposed saving is to be deducted does or does not include a
selling cost, which in turn will depend upon the custom of the particular
trade. If it does, the saving may be deducted; if it does not, any deduction
purporting to represent a saving will be dummy brokerage. The amount of
the saving will of course vary greatly depending upon the selling organization
used and its relation to the producing organization, and the computation of
saving will likewise vary according to the cost accounting applied. Normally,
no doubt, all price reductions depend rather upon the bargaining process than
upon computation of cost, and the quest for selling cost may seem futile."
But the Robinson-Patman Act, assuming a delusive certainty, requires every
inequality of price to different buyers to be justified by cost, and the compu-
tation of saving is no more difficult in this instance than in any other. And
since the burden of proof in justifying price differentials is on the respondent,
17. S. 3154, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., 1936; SE. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1936).
18. Szx. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 5.
19. 80 CoNG. REc. 6285 (1936); Hearings Before Sub-conrcillee of the Judiciary on
S. 417, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (March 24-25, 1936) 52-54. Cf. note 15, Jupra.
20. It is to be noted that in proving a price differential prohibited under § 2(a) to be
justified by a saving in selling cost to the seller, the buyer would at the same time be
proving that he was not receiving an allow-ance in lieu of dummy brokerage, prohibited
under § 2(c).
21. Cf. Hearings, supra note 5, at 452.
22. See Hamilton, Cost as a Standard for Price (1936) 4 LArw AND CONTMEP. PROM
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the buyers would -have to prove actual saving to the seller equal to the dis-
count received.23 The possibility of evasion would thus be minimized, for
dummy brokerage could not be so justified. Further, for the administration
of Section 2(c) as well as 2(a), the Commission in exercising its judgment
as to whether a price reduction reflects a saving to the seller or is the result
of excessive buying power could take into consideration the prices quoted to
others dealing on the same footing and the history of the practices of a par-
ticular buyer.
The purpose of the Act was to aid the Commission to police trade by mak-
ing Section 2 of the Clayton Act more specific as well as more stringent. 24
But the Commission's construction,25 which forbids the passing on of any
brokerage savings as differentials in cost, sacrifices too much for the sake of
certainty and efficiency. If adopted by the courts,20 it would put unjustifiable,
if not unintended premium upon the economic function of brokers.27 It
would, by making him pay the cost of brokerage in any event, fail to give the
buyer the benefit of his buying organization. Addition of the cost of main-
taining that organization to the cost of unused brokerage included in the sell-
er's price would result in discrimination against the larger buyer. At the same
time, if the buyer continued to buy direct, the seller would receive an unearned
profit. To urge that the buyer could give up his buying organization and deal
solely through brokers is only to urge the extinction of a more economical
method of distribution. Although the Act is admittedly calculated to curb the
economic 'power of large buying organizations, it purports to do so only by
removing unfair advantages.28 The freedom of economic development and
justifiable reductions in costs resulting from more efficient methods of dis-
tribution are supposedly not disturbed. To consider the problem in terms of
the constitutional power upon which the Act is bottomed, it may be that the
failure to distinguish between dummy brokerage and the allowance of reduc-
tion for saving in selling cost would result in the imposition of a restraint on
interstate commerce as heavy as that sought to be removed.
23. Section 2(b) of the Act puts the burden of justifying a discrimination upon the
respondent. For the various interpretations of the section see Zorn and Feldman, Federal
Trade Commission Hearings and the Robinson-Palmano Act (1936) 70 U. S. L. REV. 620.
The Commission has construed §2(c) as unmodified by §2(b), but even under §2(c)
alone the respondent would seem to have the burden of justification or of proving that
his case falls within the exception.
24. See F. T. C., op. cit. supra note 1, at 96.
25. Although the Tea Company advanced the argument that savings to the seller
should be deducted, it did not attempt the probably impossible task of proving such sav-
ings. It is interesting to speculate as to the result if the Company in June, 1936, had
adjusted its prices so as to reflect only the saving to particular sellers, instead of con-
tinuing its practices under different names, and had then insisted that only § 2(a) was
relevant. According to the clear dicta of the principal decision, however, the result would
have been no different.
26. See note 3, supra.
27. The food brokers had strongly urged the insertion of § 2(c) to counteract the
tendency of large buyers to absorb the brokers' function. Hearings, supra note 5, at 58
ef seq. But see ibid. at 181 et seq., where the point is made that the broker will survive
so long as he is efficient. Cf. F. T. C., op. cit. supra note 5, at 25, 50.
28. See statement by Representative Patman, Hearings, supra note 5, at 193-19S.
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FEDEAL GiFt TAx oN TRANSFERS CREATING ESTATES BY ENTDETIES *
THE FEDERAL Gift Tax levies an excise exaction upon all "transfers"
whether "in trust or otherwise," whether the gift is "direct or indirect," and
whether the property is "real or personal, tangible or intangible."1 But no
attempt is made to specify what constitutes a "transfer." By judicial interpre-
tation the concept of a "transfer" evolved under estate tax law-namely that
consideration of the shift of economic benefits resulting from a conveyance
rather than of technicalities of title is determinative--has been employed in
the assessment of the Gift Tax.3 Purporting to apply this rationale in a
recent decision, the Board of Tax Appeals, two members dissenting, reached a
seemingly variant result. Petitioner, the owner in fee of land situate in Penn-
sylvania, transferred the premises by deed to himself and his wife as tenants
by the entirety. In accordance with the Treasury Regulations, the Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue determined that the transfer constituted a taxable
gift with a value for tax purposes computed upon the basis of the present
worth of the wife's present and future interest in the propety.4 Upon appeal
to the Board, the Commissioner's contention was rejected upon two grounds:
first, that there had been merely a technical change in title which failed to
confer upon the wife property rights sufficient to constitute the transaction a
gift; and second, that Congress had evinced no intention to include within the
term "transfer" the creation in this fashion of an estate by entireties.0
The estate by entireties is an archaic device based upon an antiquated fiction
of marital unity, but it still persists in nearly all states." Although this estate
can always be created through a "straw man" transaction,' it is not possible
* William H. Hart, 36 B. T. A., Dec. 28, 1937.
1. 47 STAT. 245 (1932), 26 U.S.C. §550(b) (1934). The present Gift Tax, a pri-
mary and personal liability of the donor, is new in that It does not amend any existinm
law. The Gift Tax enacted by the Revenue Act of 1924, 43 STAT. 313 (1924) ras re-
pealed in 1926. 44 STAT. 126 (1926). For discussion of the present Gift Tax, see MonT-
GOMERY AND MAGILL, FEDERAL TAxEs oN ESTATzS, TRusrs, A m Girrs (1936) 335;
MoNroERY, FEDEmL TAX HAim0ooz (1932) 815; Legis. (1932) 32 CoL. L Rrv.
1205.
2. GvAnn v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 287 U. S. 224 (1932) (joint tenant); Saltonstall
v. Saltonstall, 276 U. S. 260 (1923) (cestui); Coolidge v. Long, 22 U. S. 582 (1931)
(remainderman) ; Tyler v. United States, 281 U. S. 497 (1930) (tenant by entireties).
3. Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U. S. 280 (1933), (1933) 10 N. Y. U. L. Q. REV.
553; (1933) 81 U. OF PA. L. REV. 776.
4. U. S. Treas. Reg. 79, Arts. 2 (7), 19 (8).
5. William H. Hart, 36 B. T. A., Dec. 28,1937. Contra: Lilly v. Smith, 384 C. C. H.
1938 Fed. Tax. Serv. 19129 (C.C.A. 7th, 1938), (1938) 51 HAnv. L. R, . 1120, rez'g,
383 C. C. H. 1938 Fed. Tax Serv. 13935.30.
6. 1 TIFFANY, REAL PrOPERTY (2d ed. 1920) § 194; Comment (1924) 37 HAnv. L
Rv. 616; (1933) 19 VA. L. Ray. 422. Estates by entirety are not recognized in England.
wn,.LAms, REAL PRoPERTY (Eastwood's ed. 1933) 346. As to the utility of this estate
compare Comments (1924) 37 HARV. L. Rav. 616; (1937) 46 YAt= L. J. 1077, with Spen-
cer, Rights of a Husband's or Wife's Individual Creditor Against an Estate by Entirely
(1923) 8 ST. Louis L. REv. 105.
7. See Marker, Problems Arising out of Tenancies by the Entirely (1931) 10 PA.
B. A. Q. 31.
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in all jurisdictions to create it directly by the conveyance of property from
one spouse to himself and his spouse together. In the absence of statutory
authority to convey to one's self and another jointly, a direct conveyance has
been held to effect merely a tenancy in common.8 Even where such legislative
authorization is present, the basic concept that the spouses are one has
been employed to prevent the creation by such a conveyance of other than a
joint tenancy.9 Pennsylvania, however, has ruled that an estate by entireties
can be created in the manner here attempted, o and state interpretations of
the nature and incidents of real estates are controlling upon the federal
courts.11
Since the common law estate by entireties has undergone a variety of chang-
es in many states, the benefits accruing to the wife upon its creation will vary
with the jurisdiction. 12 At common law, the wife as a tenant by the entirety
could claim no more than a mere expectancy in the property.18 In sharp con-
trast, the wife in Pennsylvania not only shares in rents and profits arising
from land held by entireties 4 but also can prevent her spouse from depriving
her of possession15 and preclude his creditors from attaching the property.10
Because of this difference the Board of Tax Appeals has provided that in
those states in which the common law rule prevails17 income -is returnable only
by the husband; in the other jurisdictions where income from the property
held by entireties accrues to both spouses, each spouse is entitled to report
for income tax purposes one-half of the income from the property so held.10
A similar distinction might well have been drawn in the instant case. Where,
as under the common law rule, the wife's enjoyment of the property hinges
upon her survivorship, the transfer by her spouse would not seem to occa-
sion an immediate gift. On the other hand, a transfer which affords the wife
security of possession, a joint right to rents and profits, and an estate in all
other respects equal to that of her spouse 9 would seem a present taxable
acquisition in no -way affected by the fact that the fortuitous circumstance of
her survivorship would result in a further expnnsion of this present inter-
8. Wright v. Knapp, 183 Mich. 656, 150 N. W. 315 (1915); see Deslauriers v.
Senesac, 331 I1. 437, 440, 163 N. E. 327, 329 (1928) (joint tenancy).
9. Ames v. Chandler, 265 Mass. 428, 164 N. E. 616 (1929).
10. In re Vandergrift's Estate, 105 Pa. Super. 293, 161 At. 893 (1932), (1933) 13
B. U. L. REv. 141; (1933) 18 CORN. L- 0. 284; (1933) 42 YAU L. J. 448.
11. United States v. Robbins, 269 U. S. 315 (1926); Blum v. Wardell, 270 Fed. 309
(N'. D. Cal. 1920), aff'd, 276 Fed. 226 (C. C. A. 9th, 1921), aff'd, 258 U. S. 617 (1922);
Dorna, FnmER.L PRocEnuan (1928) § 143.
12. See note 6, supra.
13. 1 TnrAny, loc. cit. supra note 6 and cases cited.
14. Gasner v. Pierce, 286 Pa. 529, 134 At. 494 (1926).
15. McCurdy v. Canning, 64 Pa. 39 (1870).
16. In re Meyer's Estate, 232 Pa. 89, 81 Atl. 145 (1911).
17. Robert C. Cooley, 27 B. T. A. 986 (1933), aff'd, Cooley v. Conm'r of Int. Rev.,
75 F. (2d) 188 (C.C.A. 1st, 1935) (Mass.).
18. John H. Hart, 27 B. T. A. 528 (1933), aff'd, Comm'r of Int. Rev. v. Hart, 76 F.
(2d) 864 (C. C. A. 6th, 1935) (Mich.); George E. Saulsbury, 27 B. T. A. 744 (1933)
(Md.); Daniel Upthegrove, 33 B. T. A. 952 (1936) (Mo.).
19. Under Pennsylvania law the estates of the parties are identical. Porobenskl v.
American Alliance Ins. Co., 317 Pa. 410, 176 At. 205 (1935).
1214 [Vol. 47
est. In reasoning that there had not been a taxable transfer, however, the
Board did not attempt to extend the formula employed in income taxation.
Relying upon the amiable fiction that each spouse holds title to the whole
estate, the Board found a fortiori that petitioner had retained title to the prop-
erty and -had merely created in his wife certain "negative rights." This result
seemingly permits a fictional unity to override the actualities of the situation.
If petitioner and wife jointly had purchased the property as tenants by the
entirety, a subsequent conveyance by one of them of his interest to the other
would dearly seem a taxable transfer.2 0 It is difficult to accept the reasoning
by which the converse of the proposition produces a contrary result.
Notwithstanding the Board's contention that Congress did not intend the
Gift Tax to cover the creation of a tenancy by entireties, the language of the
statute is clearly broad enough to include the conveyance.2 ' Hence the deci-
sion seems to rest upon the unspoken premise that it would be inconsistent to
levy a gift tax upon the transfer when the entire property would later be tax-
able upon the devolution of petitioner's estate.2- This argument was rejected
in upholding the assessment of both gift and estate taxes upon a gift made
in contemplation of death,23 and seems equally inapplicable in the present
instance. While the Supreme Court ruled in Tyler v. United States that the
decease of a tenant by entireties occasions a transfer which can be subjected
to an estate tax,2 4 that decision made no attempt to change the legal relations
between the parties to an estate by entireties. 2  Accordingly, it can scarcely
be said to preclude the assessment of a gift tax upon the transfer in the prin-
cipal case. The logical difficulty of the corpus of a gift remaining in the
donor's estate is more apparent than real, for the mere fact that upon the
death of the donor substantial economic benefits would shift to his spouse
does not preclude the possibility of an immediate transfer of other benefits
taxable as a gift.28 To except the conveyance from the provisions of the Gift
20. Cf. Wendell V. Fish, 27 B. T. A. 1002 (1933), aff'd, Fish v. Com'r of Int.
Rev., 75 F. (2d) 769 (App. D. C. 1934); Teck Hobbs, 26 B. T. A. 241 (1932).
21. See note 1, supra. In Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280 (1933), the statute
was broadly construed to embrace any transaction with the "qtality of a gift."
22. Several commentators have taken this position. See MonZco=0rav AND MAGILL,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 351; BEwsrm, THE FEziar GUr TAx (1933) § 19.
23. Vendell NV. Fish, 27 B. T. A. 1002 (1933), afftd, Fish v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 75
F. (2d) 769 (App. D. C. 1934).
24. 281 U. S. 497 (1930), (1930) 16 Conx. L. Q. 114; (1930) 79 U. or PA. L. REv.
233. Only the part contributed by the deceased to the property held by entireties is tax-
able as his estate. 44 STAT. 71 (1926), 26 U. S. C. § 411 (e) (1934). The Pennsylvania
transfer inheritance tax does not include property held by entireties passing by survivor-
ship. In re Vandergrift's Estate, 105 Pa. Super. 293, 161 AtI. 893 (1932).
25. See Lang v. Commr of Int. Rev., 289 U. S. 109, 112 (1933) (gain from sale of
property held by entireties cannot be determined upon basis that survivor takes by "in-
heritance"; gain must be measured on basis of what spouses paid for property when
acquired), (1934) 32 Micr. L. REv. 422. But cf. Comm'r of Int. Rev. v. Fletcher Sa%ings
& T. Co., 59 F. (2d) 508 (C. C. A. 7th, 1932) (surviving tenant held to take by "inheri-
tance" so as to profit by the estate tax deduction for property acquired within five years
by "inheritance."), (1932) 18 CORN. L. Q. 121.
26. See notes 14-16, 19, supra. The requisite of an irrevocable transfer stressed in
the leading case of Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U. S. 280 (1933) clearly is present in
the instant case.
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Tax merely because the property would also be computed as part of the peti-
tioner's estate is an unnecessarily narrow construction of a tax intended to
reach gratuitous transfers of "every species of right or interest protected
by law and having an exchangeable value. '27 The allowance of a gift tax
credit in the estate tax,28 indicative that Congress contemplated that certain
transfers would be subject to both taxes, would seem to reinforce this con-
clusion.29
ANTI-LAPSE STATUTES AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS*
A TESTATRIX domiciled in Ontario, Canada, died in 1927. Her will, ad-
mitted to probate in that province, included a legacy to a brother, William,
who had died the year before while domiciled in New York. By his will,
admitted to probate in New York, his son James was bequeathed three-
quarters of his residuary estate. According to Ontario law the bequest to
William did not lapse by his predecease, but took "effect as if the death of
such person had happened immediately after the death of the testator."1 James
died prior to the time the Canadian executor sent William's share to the
administrator c. t. a. for further distribution. It was distributed to William's
heirS2 under New York's laws of intestacy, as if William had died intestate.
James' heirs protested that William's share should have been distributed
according to the terms of.his will. The Erie County Surrogate's Court upheld
the action of the administrator on the grounds that the Ontario statute did
not control the distribution of the legacy, and that the legacy, being a mere
expectancy at the time of William's death, could not be bequeathed by
William's will.
The great majority of anti-apse statutes in the United States differ in
language from the century-old English modeP copied by the Ontario legis-
27. SEz. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932) 39.
28. 47 STAT. 278 (1932), 26 U. S. C. § 413 (2) (1934). Credit is also allowed against
the additional estate tax of the Act of 1932. 47 STAT. 245 (1932), 26 U. S. C, § 536
(1934). An assessment of the gift tax in the instant case would make petitioner's tax
burden somewhat heavier for, although he would have a credit against the estate tax,
he would lose interest on the gift tax paid. Moreover, he could not, as under the 1932
law [47 STAT. 180 (1932)], deduct.the amount of the gift tax from his gross income
in computing taxable net income. 48 STAT. 688, 26 U. S. C. § 23(c) (1934).
29. This argument has recently been accepted by the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit. Lilly v. Smith, 384 C. C. H. 1938 Fed. Tax Serv. 119129 (C. C. A.
7th, 1938), cited supra note 5; see Legis. (1932) 32 Co. L REV. 1205, 1211,
*Matter of Penrose, 164 Misc. 388, 299 N. Y. Supp. 844 (Surr. Ct. 1937).
1. Ox'T. Rav. STAT. (1927) c. 149, § 36(1) (Ont. Laws 1919, c. 25, § 15).
2. For simplicity the word heirs is employed in its common, though non-technical,
sense as including devisees, legatees and distributees. See WORDS AND PHRASES (1904)
pp. 3252, 3253.
3. 20 HA BuRy's STATUTES OF ENGLAND (1930) § 1104 (Wills Act 1837, § 33).
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lature.4 It is universally held in this country that those named as beneficiaries
in the statute, regardless of whether they are designated as a specified class
of descendants 5 or as the legal heirs, 6 are substituted for the predeceasing
legatee, and the testamentary gift passes directly from the original testator
to them.7 Although the established principle that an expectancy cannot be
disposed of by wills was applied to an early American anti-lapse statute similar
to the Canadian law,9 generally, the concept of fictitious survivorship of the
predeceasing legatee in the English type statute has been interpreted to pre-
vent the introduction of that principle. The words "as if the death of such
person had happened immediately after the death of the testator" are read
literally, and are held to create a fictitious survivorship which carries with it
all the incidents of an actual survivorship.10 The gift is pictured as vesting
4. For comparative discussion of American and English anti-lapse statutes, see
Bordwell, The Statute Law of Wills (1929) 14 IowA I- Rcv. 428; Mechem, Samee
Problems Arising Under Anti-Lapse Statutes (1933) 19 IowA L R-V. 1.
5. See CoNx. GF.'i. STAT. (1930) tit. 50, § 4879; N. Y. D zaznr ESTr=a I,w § 29.
6. IOWA CODE (1935) c. 505, § 11861; MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. 93,
§335. The issue of whether the heirs are to be selected under the law of the domicile
of the original testator or the law of the domicile of the predeceasing legatee appears
not to have been litigated, and is not discussed in the treatises. Judicial interpretation
might go either way, for some jurisdictions state that the legacy goes to those who
would be entitled by law to the distribution of the legatee's estate had he died intestate,
[Halsey v. Convention of Prot. Episcopal Church, 75 Md. 275, 283, 23 At. 781, 783
(1892) ], while others hold that the legatee's heirs take by force of the statute under the
will and not through the estate of the legatee (In re Estate of Mikkelsen, 202 Iowa
842, 844, 211 N. IV. 254 (1926)]. The issue arises under the administration of the estate
of the original testator, and the same reasons to be advanced infra for allowing the law
of his domicile to govern in the principal case would dictate the selection of the same
law as governing this question.
7. Ritch v. Talbot, 74 Conn. 137, 50 At!. 42 (1901); Tuttle v. Tuttle, 2 Dem. 48
(N. Y. Surr. Ct 1879); Matter of Fagin. 155 Misc. 533, =0 N. Y. Supp. 213 (Surr.
Ct. 1935) (substitution of designated beneficiaries). In re Estate of Rueschenberg. 213
Iowa 639, 239 N. IV. 529 (1931); Longerbeam v. Iser, 159 Md. 244, 150 Ad. 793 (1930)
(substitution of heirs). American scheme in general: (1932) 32 CoL. IR-%. 541;
WomrxN. THE AmEC.xA LAw or ADMIxxSTRxON (3d ed. 19.3) v. 3, § 435; 2 PAcE,
WLLS (2d ed. 1926) § 1251.
8. 1 PAGE, WiLs (2d ed. 1926) § 211.
9. Glenn v. Belt, 7 G. & J. 362 (Md. 1835). The broad statutes of Iowa and Mary-
land are the two acts in this country most susceptible to the English interpretation. but
the courts in both states have consistently followed this early decision. In re Estate of
Mikkelsen, 202 Iowa 842, 211 N. ,V. 254 (1926); McLaughlin v. McGee, 131 Md. 156,
101 AtI. 682 (1917).
10. (1934) 177 L T. 149. But there are limits to the fiction, and the court -. ill not
recognize the survivorship of a predeceasing daughter as causing an extension of cover-
ture to the time of the testator's death in order to render the legacy subject to a marriage
covenant executed by the daughter's husband. Pearce v. Graham, I New Rep. 507 (Ch.
1863).
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in the legatee, and is disposable by his will.-" And if the legatee dies intestate,
his heirs take not by substitution but by descent from the legatee, 12 and are
determined as of the date of the legatee's notional death, immediately after
that of the testator.' 3 Similarly, the fictional momentary vesting of the gift
in a predeceasing daughter gives her husband the right to curtesy.14 The
interest of the predeceasing legatee's heirs or legatees is subject to estate
duties,'8 and to claims outstanding against the predeceasing legatee at the
time of his death. 16 The Ontario law is a counterpart of the English,17 and
the rule that property passes by the will of the predeceasing legatee and not
by intestacy has been held too settled by the terms of the statute to warrant
submission to the Canadian court.'8
The court's holding in the instant case appears to be the product of a con-
fused application of both Canadian and New York substantive law to an issue
which should be resolved by reference to the laws of succession of a single
jurisdiction. The Canadian doctrine of fictitious survivorship was recognized
to prevent a lapse, but was ignored in relation to its accompanying incident,
the conferring of the privilege of testamentary disposal upon the predeceasing
legatee. Once fictional existence was recognized to prevent a lapse, it would
seem that consistency demanded continued recognition of this Canadian
doctrine throughout the decision. In rejecting the devisability of the legatee's
interest as being a mere expectancy, the court was applying the substantive
law of New York which, in its denial of the existence of fictitious survivorship,
directly opposes the Canadian rule. This commingling of legal propositions
appears to have involved the court in logical difficulties.
11. Johnson v. Johnson, 3 Hare 157 (Ch. 1843); Winter v. Winter, 5 Hare 306
(Ch. 1846); Re Mason's Will, 34 Beav. 494 (Rolls Ct. 1865); 28 HA.snunY, LAWS or
ExrGLAnD (1914) § 1196.
12. Mower v. Orr, 7 Hare 473 (Ch. 1849) ; Wisden v. Wisden, 2 Sm. & G. 396 (Ch.
1854); In the Goods of Jane Parker, I Swa. & Tr. 523 (Prob. 1860). Under the theory
that the legacy goes as part of the predeceasing legatee's estate just as if he had survived
the testator, it would seem to be clear that if the legatee died intestate, the heirs to this
legacy should be determined in the same manner as those to any other property of the
intestate, that is, by reference to the law of the legatee's domicile in the case of personalty
and to the law of the situs in the case of realty. See I JA.WA X, WILLS (7th ed. 1930)
p. 2.
13. In re Allen's Trusts, [1909] V. N. 181 (Ch.).
14. Eager v. Furnivall, 17 Ch. D. 115 (1881).
15. Executors of Perry v. Queen, L. R. 4 Ex. 27 (1868) ; In re Scott, [19011 1 K. B.
2Z8 (A. C. 1900).
16. In re Pearson, [1920] 1 Ch. 247 (legacy held to vest in predeceasing legatee's
trustee in bankruptcy and not in his four surviving children, where he died intestate after
being adjudicated bankrupt, but before obtaining a discharge).
17. Re McCallum, 27 Ont. W. N. 169 (1924). The Ontario statute itself is broader
than the English. It embraces gifts to brothers or sisters, Which the English statute does
not. It is specifically made to apply whether the predeceasing legatee died before or after
the making of the will. The English couihs have reached this same result by construction.
Under a recent amendment fONT. Rzv. STAT. (1927) c. 149, § 36(2)] the Ontario act
applies to class gifts. For the American law as to class gifts, see Cooley, "Lapse Statutes"
and Their Effect on Gifts to Classes (1936) 22 VA. L. REV. 373.
18. Re Mathe, 2 Ont. W. N. 327 (1910).
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In selecting the controlling substantive law the court paid due homage to
the Anglo-American rule that the validity and effect of a will of movables
is determined by the law of the state in which the deceased died domiciled 0
-a rule which is both well established20 and constantly growing.2 1 But the
court went astray by relating this rule to the domicile of the predeceasing
legatee rather than to the domicile of the original testatrix. An inducing factor
in this error was a confusion in treating the case as involving two independent
issues: lapse, and distribution. The problem would appear to be the broader
one of determining who should receive a Canadian legacy when the New York
legatee has predeceased the testatrix. To avoid the logical difficulties implicit
in the court's opinion, this one problem of devolution under the will of the
original testatrix cannot be split into questions referable to different patterns
of law. The problem should be referred to one pattern of law throughout, and
policy considerations of consistency, convenience, and the enforcing of intent
require that the pattern of substantive law to be selected be that of the domicile
of the original testatrix.
The simplicity of application of the rule of jus donticilii of the original
testator in the instant type of situation would be welcomed by a testator
wishing to co-ordinate testamentary desire with legal effect. The doctrine
has been justified on the basis of a presumption that every testator knows
the law and draws his will with it in mind.2 This presumption of legal
knowledge is frequently ridiculed. But the doubters may themselves be doubted
on two grounds: first, the common experience of testamentary succession may
create a rudimentary word-of-mouth knowledge of considerable accuracy;
19. Matter of Slade, 154 Misc. 275, 276 N. Y. Supp. 956 (Surr. Ct. 1935); In re
Cunnington, [1924] 1 Ch. 68; R1EST.ALTE!F.NT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 306; 2 B=.n,
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) § 306A.
20. Lowndes v. Cooch, 87 Md. 478, 39 AtI. 1045 (1898).
21. The law of the testator's domicile is now held to govern a wide field of related
problems, such as jurisdiction [Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Ackerman, 121 N. J. Eq. 497,
191 At. 813 (Ch. 1937)], definition of terms, whether dependent upon testator's con-
ceptions [Selleck v. Hawley, 331 Mo. 1038, 56 S. ,V. (2d) 387 (1932)] or upon statute
[Matter of Angarica, 157 Misc. 98, 282 N. Y. Supp. 627 (Surr. Ct. 1935)], construction
of provisions [Loftin v. Kenan, 250 App. Div. 46, 294 N. Y. Supp. 83 (1937)], distri-
bution, whether procedure of transmission [Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Aclzerman, upm],
or method of succession [Freund v. Schilling, 222 Mo. App. 901, 6 S. XV. (2d) 673
(1928)], rights of particular classes to succeed [In re Estate of Riemnann, 124 Kan. 539,
262 Pac. 16 (1927) ; Pfeifer v. Wright, 41 F. (2d) 464 (C. C. A. 10th, 1930), cert. de-
izied, 282 U. S. 896 (1930)], rights to take contrary to testamentary disposition [Matter
of Slade, 154 Misc. 275, 276 N.Y. Supp. 956 (Surr. Ct. 1935)], rights of third parties
against the estate [Matter of Killough, 148 Misc. 73. 265 N. Y. Supp. 301 (Surr. Ct.
1933)1, rights of state against the estate, by taxation [Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U. S. 1
(1928)] or by escheat [,Matter of Simonds, 188 Wash. 211, 61 P. (2d) 1302 (1936)1; see
generally, Goodrich, Inheritance Problems in the Conflict of Laws (1926) 24 Micm. L.
RLx. 558. Exceptions are pricking out limits to the growth of jus domicilii: Matter of
Adriance, 158 Misc. 857, 286 N. Y. Supp. 936 (Surr. Ct. 1936) (contrary desire of testa-
tor) ; Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U. S. 30 (1931) (conflict with paramount law) ; Dar-
row v. Moore, 163 Miss. 705, 142 So. 447 (1932) (error in law of domicile).
22. Zombro v. Moffett, 329 Mo. 137, 145, 44 S. V. (2d) 149, 152 (1931).
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second, and more important, testators, desiring to ordain with some certainty
the disposition of their goods, may be led to acquire vicarious legal knowledge
by applying to an attorney for the drawing of the instrument. When a testator
desires to make bequests to persons in different states and countries, he can
not, without the principle of jus domicilii, attach a reasonably certain conse-
quence to the expression of his desire by conforming his will to one pattern
of law,23 but he would have to look to two, or four, or forty-eight different
patterns, and would still run the risk of having his wishes defeated by a sub-
sequent change in domicile by one of his legatees.
That the controlling consideration in interpreting a will must be the testa-
tor's intention 24 is frequently termed one of the most basic principles in the
law of decedents' estates. Under the English and Canadian construction of
the anti-lapse statutes it may be said that the testatrix in the principal case
intended to pass the power of testamentary disposal along with her gift.
25
It does not militate against this argument that in specific instances the actual
presence of this intent may be too speculative to determine, 26 for it is reason-
ible and desirable to presume this intent.2 The English judges remarked
long ago that it was natural that a testator would wish his legatee to have
the same power of testamentary disposal that he himself had over the same
property.28 It is as desirable that the legatee should have that power as it
is that he should be able to will any other property he may acquire.20 The
likelihood of such intent is increased in the type of situation presented by the
principal case, where the testator is at a distance from his legatee and may
be unfamiliar with the circumstances of the individual members of the legatee's
family. This likelihood is also heightened by the fact that the gift is to one
in the same age-group as the testator, with correspondingly less chance for
prolonged personal enjoyment. Finally, the English view finds support in
the constantly reiterated principle that the law abhors an intestacy. 30 By pre-
suming an intent to confer the privilege of testamentary disposal, the English
23. See SUMxnG, PRINCIPLES or COFLICr OF LAWS (1937) p. 379-380.
24. Holmes v. Dunning, 260 Mass. 250, 253. 157 N. E. 358, 359 (1927); Selleck v.
Hawley, 331 Mo. 1038, 1052, 56 S. W. (2d) 387, 393 (1932).
25. The case is stronger for a finding of actual intent than most cases where intent
must be found from an absence, rather than a presence, of words. The Canadian statute
specifically is made to apply "unless a contrary intention appears by the will." Thus,
the testatrix may be said to have done what the statute prescribed to express the affirma-
tive intention.
26. "True, the search for intention is often a search after a phantom . . 'The
question is one not of intention in the proper sense, but of the legal implications of one
formula or another!" .Matter of Chalmers, 264 N.Y. 239. 245. 190 N. E. 476, 478 (1934).
27. See Mechem, supra note 4, at 1.
28. Johnson v. Johnson. 3 Hare 157, 161 (Ch. 1843).
29. While the legislature may attempt in the statute of distributions to set a general
standard of fairness in sharing, it is important that a decedent, with his knowledge of the
particular situation, be able to adjust by will the legislature's general standard to a more
absolute one.
30. See Waterman v. New York Life his. & Trust Co.. 237 N. Y. 293, 300. 142 N. E.




statute avoids intestacy in the maximum number of cases, whereas the
American construction in effect causes intestacy even where, as in the prin-
cipal case, there is little doubt of the predeceasing legatee's desire to dispose
of his estate in- a method counter to the statutory manner of distribution.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE JURISDICTION oF NLRB*
THE FAILURE of the WVagner Act cases' to prescribe a definitive test of the
extent of the NLRB's jurisdiction in interstate commerce left open to future
adjudication the Board's power over employers not of the types there con-
sidered.2 Within the past year the applicability of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act3 to other types of employers has been contested repeatedly before
the Board and the courts. Two recent decisions of importance 4 suggest a
re-examination of the Act's jurisdictional boundaries.
According to the constitutional standards set by the Wagner Act cases,
the statutory power of the Board to prevent labor practices which "affect
commerce" 5 extends to regulation of activities which "have such a close and
substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or
appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens or obstructions. ' In this
category the court placed employers in nationally important industries whose
plant operations were wholly within a state, but who nonetheless shipped,
predominantly in interstate commerce, products fabricated from raw materials
which were, to a large extent, imported from other states. In discussing the
issue of jurisdiction, the court apparently considered also important the
extent to which the industry was unionized and the employer organized, on
a national scale.7 Guided by these vague criteria, which were developed only
*Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 58 Sup. Ct.
656 (U. S. 1938); Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. National Labor Relations
Board, C. C. A. 2d, March 14, 1938, 2 LAB. R.. REP. 97.
1. National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1
(1937) ; National Labor Relations Board v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U. S. 49 (1937) ;
National Labor Relations Board v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U. S.
58 (1937).
2. The Jones & Laughlin case concerned a local unit of a large steel corporation
whose production was integrated on a national scale; the Fruehauf case, an important
producer of trailers; the Friedman-Harry Marks case, a relatively small clothing manu-
facturer, part of an industry of national scope and importance. Each employer imported
from other states and exported into other states a large volume of products.
3. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S.C. § 151 (Supp. 1937).
4. Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 58 Sup. Ct.
656 (U.S. 1938) ; Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. National Labor Relations
Board, C. C. A. 2d, March 14, 1938, 2 LAB. REL. REP. 97.
5. 49 STAT. 453 (1935), 29 U. S. C. §160 (Supp. 1937).
6. National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U. S. 1, 37
(1937).
7. See National Labor Relations Board v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U. S. 49, 53
(1937); National Labor Relations Board v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301
U. S. 58, 73 (1937).
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with reference to the cases immediately before the Court, the Board has
found potential obstructions to interstate commerce in many situations out-
side the immediate compass of the Wagner Act decisions. For example, the
Board has assumed jurisdiction of companies which obtain a negligible quan-
tity of raw materials or equipment from other states, but which ship out
much of their finished products ;8 of large wholesale agencies, which distribute
wholly within a state products imported from other states ;" and of electric
power corporations which neither import nor export any significant amount
of raw materials, equipment, or power.' 0
By now it is definitely established that the scope of the Act extends further
than merely to employers who both import raw materials and export finished
products across state lines. The Supreme Court has recently upheld the
jurisdiction of the Board over an important fruit packer who shipped into
interstate commerce 37% of its products, all of which were derived exclusively
from domestic raw materials and equipment.11 Although the Carter case"-
had denied Congress constitutional power to regulate collective bargaining
in similar enterprises, here, as in the Jones-Laughlin case, the Court declined
to overrule the Carter holding expressly.13 Emphasizing that the effect upon
commerce requisite for federal jurisdiction is a question of degree, not of
mathematical formula, the Court held that the activities of this type of em-
ployer bore a sufficiently close and substantial relation to interstate commerce
to be subject to the Act. It is idle to speculate on ways of effecting a meta-
physical reconciliation of the two cases. Realistically, the Carter case must
be considered repudiated on its commerce points.1 4 The result of the Santa
Cruz decision should be 'to privilege the Board to take jurisdiction over any
employer who ships'a substantial part of his goods across state lines, Fur-
8. In re Idaho-Maryland Mines Corp., C-260, 4 NLRB No. 97 (Jan. 10, 1938);
In re Clover Fork Coal Co., C-213, 4 NLRB No. 33 (Nov. 27, 1937) ; In re Greens-
boro Lumber Co., 1 NLRB 629 (1936); In re Campbell Machine Co., R-249, 3 NLRB
No. 79 (Oct. 4, 1937) (ship building company buying raw materials within the state,
but manufacturing and repairing fishing boats operating beyond the three mile limit);
National Labor Relations Board v. Carlisle Lumber Co., 94 F. (2d) 138 (C. C. A. 9th,
1937) (lumber mill producing from domestic lumber, shipping out 90% of its finished
products).
9. In re Suburban Lumber Co., C-162, 3 NLRB No. 17 (Aug. 2, 1937); In re
Danahy Packing Co., R-224, 3 NLRB No. 30 (Sept. 17, 1937).
10. In re Pacific Gas and Electric Co., R-274, 3 NLRB No. 87 (Oct. 16, 1937);
In re Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc., C-245, 4 NLRB No. 10 (Nov. 10,
-1937).
11. Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 58 Sup. Ct.
656 (U. S. 1938).
12. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238 (1936).
13. "The case of Carter v. Carter Coal Co.. . . did not establish a different principle
or overrule the decisions which we have cited." Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. National
Labor Relations Board, 58 Sup. Ct., 656, 660 (U. S. 1938).
14. See Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 91 F.
(2d) 790 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937) ; National Labor Relations Board v. Carlisle Lumber Co.,
94 F. (2d) 138 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937); Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. National Labor
Relations Board, 58 Sup. Ct., 656, 661 (U. S. 1938), Butler, J., dissenting.
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thermore, as long as stoppage of the volume exported to other states would
have an important effect upon the general volume of commerce, no limitation
on federal power arises merely because the employer's production is pre-
dominantly for the local market. Correlatively, the applicability of the Act
to the wholesale distributor who is situated at the terminus of a flow of
goods seems dearly to follow from this decision.15 In neither case is it likely
that the Supreme Court will henceforth entertain petitions for review of
Board decisions unless the Board's judgment as to the question of degree
appears to be a flagrant error.
The next problem to be determined by the Supreme Court involves the
applicability of the Act to an important electric power corporation which
neither imports basic raw materials nor exports finished products in any
significant amount. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
has approved such jurisdiction in the Consolidated Edison case.0 The
Board's power was there premised on the likelihood that strikes in the
respondents' plants would result in serious derangement not only of inter-
state commerce facilities such as telephones, telegraphs and railroads, but
also of businesses making interstate shipments. The potential effect of such
a strike was depicted as equivalent to simultaneous strikes by the employees
of all industries dependent for their continued operation upon power fur-
nished by the utilities before the Board. Moreover, since commerce might
seriously be burdened by labor disturbances in the employer's plants, the
absence of an interstate flow of goods with which the respondents were directly
identified was not regarded as controlling. The activities of this type of
employer dearly have a substantial effect upon commerce. But the Supreme
Court has in the past required this effect to be direct as well as substantial. 17
The distinction, if any there be, is hard to grasp and impossible to apply.
Although in the Schechter case i8 the regulated activities were more directly
related to interstate commerce in the sense of proximity to its flow than are
those of the respondent utility, their effect upon commerce was thought to
be too indirect to warrant federal control. That case, however, hardly fore-
doses jurisdiction, for causal relations do not depend alone upon propinquity.
In the Schechter case, the government urged the propriety of federal regu-
lation chiefly on the ground that general business activity would be increased
15. See generally, Mueller, Businesses Subject to the National Labor Relation Act
(1937) 35 Mica. L REv. 1286.
16. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. National Labor Relations Board,
C. C. A. 2d, March 14, 1938, 2 LAB. R~t. RrP. 97.
17. Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 58 Sup. Ct.,
656 (U. S. 1938) ; see National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U. S. 1, 41 (1937).
18. Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935); see Industrial Associa-
tion v. United States, 268 U. S. 64 (1925) (effect upon interstate commerce of a con-
spiracy to prevent building contractors from obtaining supplies if they recognized unions
held too indirect to support jurisdiction under the Sherman Act) ; but cf. The Shreveport
case, 234 U. S. 342 (1914) (effect upon interstate rates held to give jurisdiction to the
Interstate Commerce Commission to change rates set by state Railroad Commission).
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by the NIRA codes, thereby swelling the volume of interstate commerce.
19
But apparently it was thought that the regulations there in question were
not directed principally at preservation of the continuity of the flow of com-
merce of which the plaintiff was the terminus. Here, the result of labor
disturbances in the respondent's plants which the Act seeks to prevent may
be an immediate and drastic curtailment of both the operation of the agencies
of interstate commerce and its flow as well. Since the effect upon commerce,
not the source of the injury, is the criterion, 20 the Board's jurisdiction should
attach whether the relation of the employer to interstate commerce be primary
or secondary.
Liberal utilization of this "obstruction to commerce" doctrine as the test
of jurisdiction has the advantage of making possible federal regulation more
commensurate with national need than if direct identification with the flow
of commerce were required as the sole basis for jurisdiction.21 Obviously
the future scope of the National Board's interstate commerce jurisdiction
cannot be predicted on the basis of meaningless, definitional standards. Al-
though the Supreme Court has indicated that the jurisdictional line must be
so drawn as to avoid completely centralized government,z2 this interpretation
is flexible enough to enable the Board to take jurisdiction over any employer
whose activities, by any of the tests outlined above, appreciably affect inter-
state commerce.2
INDISPENSABILITY OF AN ABSENT Co-PATENTEE IN AN INFRINGEMENT SUIT*
THE RIGHT of a patentee to exclude all others from making, using, and
selling his invention is said to be indivisible. A patent may, nevertheless, be
owned by any number of persons, either as joint patentees or as partial
assignees; they acquire undivided interests, and the patent remains "one
entire thing."' The owner of such an undivided interest may exercise it as
19. 295 U. S. 495, at 546. Compare the reasoning of the Board in In re Idaho-
Maryland Mines Corp. C-260, 4 NLRB No.97 (Jan. 10, 1938) holding a gold mine subject
to the Act, partly on the ground that gold is so important as the national credit and
monetary base that a reduction in its supply would have a harmful effect upon interstate
commerce. This reasoning seems closely analogous to that which the Court refused to
follow in the Schechter case.
20. National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U. S. 1,
32 (1937).
21. Persuasive arguments have been advanced for vitalizing the commerce clause
to achieve this result. See CoRwiN, THE CoMERcE POWER VS. STATES' RIGHTS (1936);
HAmIonoN, THE POWER TO GOVERN (1937).
22. National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U. S. 1, 37
(1937).
23. See Shulman, Book Review, (1938) 51 HARv. L. REv. 1121, 1125.
*Rainbow Rubber Co. v. Holtite Mfg. Co., 20 F. Supp. 913 (D. Md. 1937).
1. Gayler v. Wilder, 10 How. 477 (U. S. 1850); Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138
U. S. 252 (1891) ; Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully & Jeffrey Mfg. Co., 144 U. S. 248 (1892);
cf. REV. STAT. § 4898 (1875), 35 U. S. C. § 47 (1934) (permits territorial division).
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freely as if he owned the whole patent; he is under no duty to account to his
co-owners for his profits; and, in the absence of special agreement, he may
grant licenses or further subdivide his interest 2 But, as illustrated by a recent
case, when he attempts to protect it against infringement, the concept of the
patent as an undivided whole, and of the interest as a joint one, may create
difficulties. The plaintiff, owner of an undivided half of a patent, brought a
bill against an alleged infringer in the district of the latter's residence,3 asking
for an injunction and an accounting of profits and damages. The owner of
the other half of the patent, a resident of another district and not subject
to the court's process, was hostile and declined to join in the suit. The
defendant's motion to dismiss for non-joinder of an indispensable party was
granted.4
Unless the plaintiff can induce his co-owmer to join, he would appear to
be remediless. In an action at law, the mere fact that his interest is joint
would ordinarily forbid him to sue alone,5 and though no cases involving co-
owners of patents raise the precise issue, hostility of an absent co-owner
would probably be no excuse for non-joinder." Whether the same result is
reached in equity depends upon the distinction made in federal practice be-
tween "necessary" and "indispensable" parties.1 The former may be dispensed
with if the court's process will not reach them or if their joinder would oust
jurisdiction, but if the latter cannot be joined on one side or the other, the
2. Bladdedge v. Weir & Craig Mfg. Co., 108 Fed. 71 (C. C.A. 7th, 1901); Vose
v. Singer, 4 Allen 226 (Mass. 1862); Steers v. Rogers (1893] A. C. 232 (H. L.);
2 WALYum, PATmrs (Deller's ed. 1937) § 364.
3. A patentee can sue either in equity, or, in an "action on the case" for damages,
in law. Rrv. STAT. §§4919, 4921 (1875), 35 U.S.C. §§67, 70 (1934). Federal district
courts have exclusive jurisdiction. REv. STAT. § 711 (1875), 28 U.S. C. § 371 (1934).
Venue may be laid in the district the defendant inhabits, or in which he has a regular
and established place of business and has committed acts of infringement. 36 STAT.
1100 (1911), 28 U.S. C. § 109 (1934).
4. Rainbow Rubber Co. v. Holtite Mfg. Co., 20 F. Supp. 913 (D. Md. 1937);
cf. Southern Textile Machinery Co. v. Fay Stocking Co., 243 Fed. 917 (N. D. Ohio
1917) (same holding; but no issue that co-owner unavailable). Contra: Sheehan v.
Great Eastern Ry., 16 Ch. D. 59 (1880).
5. See CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) 242-3.
6. Cf. Valentine v. Marshal, 28 Fed. Cas. No. 16,812a (C. C. S.D. N.Y. 1845);
Jordan v. Dobson, 13 Fed. Cas. No. 7,519 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1870) ; Van Orden v. Mayor
of Nashville, 67 Fed. 331 (C. C. M. D. Tenn. 1895) (joinder of co-owmers in infringe-
ment actions compulsory).
7. Waterman v. Canal-Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 215 U. S. 33 (1909); see
28 U. S. C. A. § 723, n. 262-82 (1934). The distinction has developed almost independently
of Equity Rules 37 ("Persons having a united interest must be joined . . . ") and
39 (proper parties out of jurisdiction). 28 U. S. C. A. following § 723 (1934). Cf. Rxv.
STAT. § 737 (1875), 28 U. S.C. § 111 (1934). The new rules change the wording of
Equity Rule 37 to "persons having a joint interest shall be made parties and joined
." but this is subject to a proviso that the court in its discretion may proceed
without unavailable parties unless they are indispensable. Rules of Civil Procedure
for the District Courts of the United States (1937) Rule 19. Since no definition of
indispensability is given, the present criteria will probably persist.
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court may not proceed in the case.8 Indispensability of parties plaintiff depends
on two questions, each of which is to some extent the corollary of the other.
These are first, whether the court can formulate a decree which will protect
the defendant from a second suit at the hands of the absent plaintiff,9 and
second, whether it can decide the issues between the parties before it without
determining legal relations of the absent party, who has not been heard, and
against whom the court could not enforce its decree.10
As a criterion for indispensability, the desire to protect the defendant from
a second suit is not inflexible, for there are cases in which the courts have
either ignored the possibility of a second suit," or have excused it as neces-
sary to prevent a supposed miscarriage of justice.' 2 However, these prec-
edents would seem not to be controlling in patent infringement suits, for
either as a consequence of, or as a feason for the indivisibility of the patent
monopoly, the courts, drawing a gloomy picture of an "innocent infringer"
harassed in twenty suits by as many co-patentees,'5 have repeatedly proclaimed
a privilege in the infringer to have all his liability determined in one action.14
In the instant case, it would be argued that a trial and dismissal of the suit
on its merits would leave the absent co-owner free to relitigate the question
of infringement; and while he could not complain of the issuance of an in-
junction protecting his interest, he would not be bound by the accompanying
award of damages, and might seek to make his own proof if the present
plaintiff's failed.1 5 Therefore it would be inequitable to the defendant to
allow the instant plaintiff to maintain his action.
8. Indispensability is determined not by relatively fixed rules, as in actions at
law, but by a loose formula to the effect that though equity seeks to conclude all the
parties concerned in, and all the issues arising out of a controversy, a party is not
indispensable if without him a decree can be made which will not affect his interest,
and which will completely and equitably decide the case as between the parties. Elmen-
dof v. Taylor, 10 Wheat. 152 (U. S. 1825); Shields v, Barrow, 17 How. 130 (U. S,
1854) ; West v. Randall, 29 Fed. Cas. No. 17,424 (C. C. D. R. I. 1820).
9. Niles-Bement-Pond Co. v. Iron Moulders Union Local No. 68, 254 U. S. 77
(1920) ; MacAulay v. Moody, 185 Fed. 144 (C. C. D. Ore. 1911).
10. Gregory v. Stetson, 133 U. S. 579 (1890); Halpin v. Savannah River Elee. Co.,
41 F. (2d) 329 (C. C.A. 4th," 1930).
11. Rogers v. Penobscot Mining Co., 154 Fed. 606 (C.C.A. 8th, 1907); Grigsby
v. Miller, 231 Fed. 521 (D. Ore. 1916).
I2 Williams v. Crabb, 117 Fed. 193 (C. C.A. 7th, 1902); Atwood v, R. I. Hospital
Trust Co., 275 Fed. 513 (C. C.A. 1st, 1921). But cf. Hoe v. Williams, 9 Wall. 501
(U. S. 1869).
13. See Gayler v. Wilder, 10 How. 477, 494 (U. S. 1850).
14. Gayler v. Wilder, 10 How. 477 (U. S. 1850); Independent Wireless Tel. Co.
v. Radio Corp. of America, 269 U. S. 459 (1926); Southern Textile Mach. Co. v. Fay
Stocking Co., 243 Fed. 917 (N. D. Ohio 1917). But this protection does not fully
extend to actions at law. Moore v. Marsh, 7 Wall. 515 (U. S. 1868) (assignor can
sue for damages accrued during his ownership).
15. Cf. Board of Trustees of Oberlin College v. Blair, 70 Fed. 414 (C. C. W. Va. 1895)
(co-devisee suing trustee for fraudulent conveyances); Roos v. Texas Co., 23 F. (2d)
171 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927) (assignor of oil leases for accounting and damages). Without
these objections, an absent co-owner could be adequately protected by having his share
of the recovery paid into court. Cf. Parker v. Ross, 234 Fed. 289 (C. C. A. 7th, 1916).
(Vol. 471226
The foregoing argument would appear to be conclusive, if it assumes
correctly that the absent co-owner would not be bound by the decree and
could relitigate the issues. Since he has not submitted to the jurisdiction of
the court, it seems clear that he is not bound in the sense that he must obey
the court's ordersY6 And it seems equally clear that he cannot be made a
party without his consent. The patent right is not such a res as will support
substituted service ;17 nor can the nation-wide process of federal interpleader
be employed.18 And although the Supreme Court has held that an exclusive
licensee of a patent may join his hostile and unavailable licensor as plaintiff
against an infringer,29 the rationale of that decision rested on an implied
contract to join, and on a trust relationship between licensor and licensee.
The co-owners here, who claim under a common assignor, have perhaps had
no contractual relations whatever, and, in view of the almost complete inde-
pendence with which each may exercise the patent right2 can scarcely be
said to stand in any fiduciary relationship. Consequently, since he cannot
be made a party, a decree in the principal case would seem not to be res
judicata as to the absent co-owner.21
But despite the apparent conclusiveness of precedent, another solution, pre-
venting the hostile co-owner from later relitigating the issues, is possible.
When he attempted to sue, the earlier holding that his co-owner could sue
alone would not automatically permit him to do likewise, for the question
whether parties are indispensable or only conditionally necessary is addressed
to the policy and discretion of the court.P And unless the court believed the
16. Hart v. Sansom, 110 U. S. 151 (1884).
17. Non-Magnetic Watch Co. v. Association Horlogire Suisse of Genave, 44 Fed.
6 (C. C. S.D. N.Y. 1890) ; Standard Gas Power Co. of Ga. v. Standard Gas Power Co.
of Del., 224 Fed. 990 (N. D. Ga. 1915). Furthermore, the situs of a jointly-o~wned
patent would be difficult to determine. Cf. Ebsary Gypsum Co. v. Ruby, 256 N. Y.
406, 176 N. F_. 820 (1931).
18. Federal interpleader contemplates a fixed obligation deposited with the court
for the rightful owner among two or more adverse claimants. 49 STAr. 1095 (1936),
28 U.S. C. § 41 (26) (Supp. 1937).
19. Independent Wireless Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 269 U. S. 459 (1926).
The process by which this is accomplished has been described as substituted service.
Deitel v. Chisholm, 42 F. (2d) 172 (C. CA. 2., 1930), cert. deried, 282 U. S. 873
(1930). Cf. Bolton v. Cuthbert, 132 Ala. 403, 31 So. 358 (1902) (joint owner could be
made plaintiff in detinue, though out of state).
20. About the only limitation seems to be that a release of an infringer by one co-
owner does not destroy the other's right of action. Lalance & Grosjean Mfg. Co. v.
Haberman Mfg. Co., 93 Fed. 197 (C. C. S.D. N.Y. 1899). Accord: In re Horsley &
Knighton's Patent, L. R. 8 Eq. 475 (1869).
21. The exceptions to the rule that a person is not concluded by a decree to which
he is not a party seem inapplicable. Cf. Robbins v. Chicago, 4 aVaiL 657 (U. S. 1866) ;
American Bell Tel. Co. v. National Improved TeL Co., 27 Fed. 663 (C. C. F. D. La. 1886)
(defendant'after undertaking'defense in action against infringer withdrew; held estopped
from later contesting validity of patent).
22. Elmendorf v. Taylor, 10 Wheat. 152 (U. S. I825); Rules of Civil Procedure,
supra note 7, Rule 19(b).
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first suit to have been collusive, it would seem a not unwarranted exercise
of discretion to deny to the previously indifferent or hostile co-owner the
privilege of maintaining an action alone. Such a ruling would effectively
exclude him, for even if the first plaintiff were willing to join in the second
action, it is believed that he would be barred by the decision in his own case.23
It must be admitted, however, that such a procedure, though feasible, is
supported by little authority;24 and it is not altogether clear that it would
result in an equitable disposition of the case. For example, the instant opinion
intimated that on the merits the defendant would plead a license from the
absent co-owner, which, if proved, would completely protect him.25 And
the decision whether a valid license existed, though determining rights of
the absent co-owner, would not be binding on him, and a finding of no
license, subjecting the defendant to liability in the instant case, would not
prevent the co-owner from later relitigating the validity of the license;20
this would be another reason for holding him to be indispensable.21
The result of the instant case may seem harsh on the plaintiff, but it is
historically an incident of almost any'kind of joint ownership that one co-
owner cannot sue unless all are made parties. 28 If a jurisdictional impasse
like the present one is at all foreseeable, it would be prudent for joint owners
to covenant to participate in suits against invaders of the joint interest.20
A more effective device to control co-patentees, who, it has been said, are
at the mercy of each other,80 would be to put the patent in trust, with one
co-owner as trustee. The latter could be controlled by ordinary chancery
powers, and, as holder of the legal title, could prosecute infringers without
raising baffling problems of joinder.81
23. This would follow from conventional principles of res judicata. Cromwell v.
County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351 (1876).
24. Cf. Radio Corp. of America v. Indep. Wireless Tel. Co., 297 Fed. 521 CC. C. A.
2d, 1924), aff'd, 269 U. S. 459 (1926) (exclusive licensee suing, licensor not in juris-
diction; similar solution offered to prevent second suit; affirmance of this point, however,
on another ground).
25. Dunham v. Indianapolis & St. Louis R.R., 8 Fed. Cas. No. 4,151 (C. C. N. D. Ill.
1876) ; Blackledge v. Weir & Craig Mfg. Co., 108 Fed. 71 (C. C. A. 7th, 1901).
26. E.g., in an action for a declaratory judgment, or as a defense to an action by
the instant defendant on the licensor's implied warranty of his power to license.
27. Cf. Standard Stoker Co., Inc. v. Lower, 46 F. (2d) 678 (D. Md. 1931). When
the question of indispensability may turn on the nature of the defense, it would seem
advisable to postpone the jurisdictional decision until the issues are fully clarified.
28. Slingsby's Case, 5 Coke 34 (1588); Brookes v. Burt, 1 Beav. 106 (Ch. 1838).
29. See ELLIS, PATENT AsSIGNMENTS ANI LICENSES (1936) § 91. Cf. Jackson v.
Allen, 120 Mass. 64 (1876); Fageol & Tate v. Baird-Bailhache Co., 138 Cal. App. 1,
5 P. (2d) 75 (1931) (similar agreements between licensors and licensees).
30. See Copeland v. Eaton, 209 Mass. 139, 144, 95 N. E. 291, 292 (1911).
31. A "trustee of an express trust . . . may sue in his ovm name without joining
with him the party for whose benefit the action is brought"' Rules of Civil Procedure,
supra note 7, Rule 17(a), supplanting Equity Rule 37; Carey v. Brown, 92 U. S. 171
(1875). A trust agreement among co-patentees was efficaciously employed in McDuffee
v. Hestonville, M. & F. Pass. Ry., 162 Fed. 36 (C. C. A. 3d, 1908).
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